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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROTECTION AND TRADE 
DEFLECTION 
by 
Veysel Avsar 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Richard Chisik, Major Professor 
This dissertation analyzes the trading effects and the politics of antidumping. 
The first essay empirically examines the influence of partisanship on 
antidumping. I show that an increase in the leftist orientation of the 
government makes labor intensive industries less likely to file an 
antidumping petition. I also demonstrate that the increase in the leftist 
orientation of the government is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
of an affirmative antidumping outcome for the petitions of labor intensive 
industries.  
 The second essay investigates the effect of past exporting 
relationships of the firms, whose products are targeted by antidumping 
duties, on their export flows to alternative markets. My estimations show 
that facing an antidumping duty on a product leads to a 18% increase in the 
exports of the firm for that product to the alternative countries where the 
firms previously exported the same product and a 8% increase to the 
vi 
 
countries where the firms exported another product. On the contrary, I fail to 
find a significant effect of antidumping duties on the exports of the particular 
product to third countries to which the firm did not export before. Further, I 
show that a firm’s probability to start exporting the duty imposed product in 
a different destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported 
another product to that destination. However, I find no such evidence for the 
countries to which the firm did not export before.  
The third essay empirically analyzes the effect of potential 
antidumping claims, resulting from an antidumping investigation in the 
domestic market, on the quality of exported products to the target countries. 
My findings suggest that retaliation threats increase the quality of firms’ 
shipments for the named industries’ products to the target countries by 11%. 
This effect is also significantly increasing in the share of the exports of the 
named industries’ products shipped to the target country in the firms’ total 
exports. Further, I show that this effect is 4 % higher for the exporters 
serving the developed countries and 3% higher for ones serving the heavy 
antidumping users. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INDUSTRY LEVEL EVIDENCE ON PARTISAN TRADE 
POLICY: TARIFF vs. ANTIDUMPING 
Introduction 
To date, the role of political ideology in the choice of economic policy 
instruments has received serious attention by political economists. Much of 
the existing studies suggest that in a democratic regime, political parties 
which compete for electoral votes try to adopt policies in favor of their 
electoral base. Hence, it is the constituents’ interests which determine the 
ideological attitude of the governments. Generally, the political party that is 
in the left ideological spectrum represents workers, whereas the right-wing 
represents capital owners.1 
Trade policy is one of the policy instruments, which enables a political 
party to differentiate itself from others to compete for votes. 
The redistributive consequence of the trade policy is the pivotal argument of 
the political economists who have emphasized the partisan-based trade 
policy. For instance, Milner and Judkins (2004), henceforth 
MJ, investigate the relationship between “class cleavage based partisanship” 
and “trade policy” of a political party and find that left-wing parties in 
advanced industrial countries adopt more protectionist policies compared to 
                                                            
1 See Hibbs (1977), Alesina(1987), Hibbs, Rivers and Vasilatos (1982), Pinto and Pinto (2008) 
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the right-wing parties. Focusing on US trade policy between 1877 and 1934, 
Epstein and O.Halloran (1996) showed that Republicans raised the tariffs, 
while Democrats cut them. Rogowski (1989, pp. 98) predicts that in countries, 
such as United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which 
are capital and land rich, left-wing parties should be protectionist. By 
combining the political support function of Hillman (1989) with Stoper-
Samuelson theorem, Dutt and Mitra (2005), henceforth (DM), show that left-
wing governments are protectionist in capital abundant countries, whereas 
they are pro-trade in labor abundant countries when compared to their right-
wing counterparts. Further, Krever (2008) highlights the impact 
of partisan preferences on the government’s decision to form preferential 
trade agreements. His results indicate that independent of its factor 
endowments, a country is more likely to form preferential trade 
agreements when there is a right-wing government in power. 
In this paper, I exploit the three-digit ISIC industries’ trade and 
protection data to analyze the effect of political ideology on trade policy. My 
first focus is the level of tariffs, which is an extension of DM (2005) to the 
industry level. Second, I examine whether the political ideology of the 
governments affect the usage of antidumping. In this regard, my study 
represents the first attempt to integrate antidumping in the study of partisan 
trade policy.   
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Antidumping has become the most effective contingent protection tool 
in the past 20 years. Until the late 1980s, the use of AD was limited to 
developed countries; however, its world-wide use has increased over the past 
decade. According to Bown (2008), more than 40 members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have become active users of AD. The WTO records also 
show that there were 4,364 AD cases initiated between 1991 and 2007. 
Aggarwal (2007, pp.151, 152) notes three possible perspectives for the 
rationale behind the proliferation of AD: the political perspective, the 
political economy perspective, and the economic perspective. The first two 
argues that AD is a GATT/WTO legal trade remedy used to provide 
protection to the domestic firms which is injured by the imports of their 
foreign competitors. On the other hand, AD is a policy which aims to prevent 
predatory dumping, a situation where unfair pricing drives the domestic 
firms out of the market, according to the economic perspective. In this study, 
I build on the “political economy perspective” to antidumping and seek 
evidence as to whether the political ideology of the government has an effect 
on AD usage. 
Antidumping has some appealing features that have led to fruitful 
approaches for researchers. The main difference between AD and tariffs is 
that in order to receive protection in the form of an AD duty, a firm has to file 
an investigation and show evidence that the exporting firm’s price is lower 
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than the "fair price" it normally charges in its home market. In addition to 
this, it has to prove that the domestic industry is "materially injured" by the 
different pricing in different markets (WTO 1995, Article 2.1 and 3.4). In 
addition, Prusa (2001) argues that AD duties have larger effects on trade 
flows of particular goods, compared to MFN (Most favored nation) tariffs, 
given the fact that AD duties are 10 to 20 times higher than the MFN level. 
His results show that AD duties decrease the value of total imports by 30-
50%. He also finds that even if the AD investigations do not result 
affirmatively, the initiations themselves decrease the imports for the goods 
subject to filings. Even though this last finding of Prusa (2001) is an incentive 
for firms to file an investigation, the fixed cost of each petition has an 
opposite effect on this incentive. On the other hand, Blonigen (2006) suggests 
that prior experience of firms in pursuing an AD petition increases the 
probability of a successful outcome. 
Studies which examine the determinants of AD initiations also focus 
on the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on AD filings. For 
instance, Feinberg (2005) analyzes the AD petitions of U.S. firms and shows 
that decrease in GDP growth rates and appreciation of domestic currency is 
associated with higher probability of AD initiations. Knetter and Prusa 
(2003) also arrived at the same conclusion. In addition, Francois and Neils 
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(2006) finds that Mexican firms are more likely to file an AD petition in 
periods of current account deficit. 
Another focus in the AD literature is the strategic consideration of the 
AD activity. Prusa and Skeath (2002) provide evidence that countries are 
more likely to name the exporters of the countries which previously filed AD 
cases against them. Using a nested logit framework where the first stage 
determines the decision to file an AD investigation and the second stage 
determines the government's decision to impose an AD duty, Blonigen and 
Bown (2003) show that potential retaliation threats affect both the initiations 
and outcomes of antidumping in the US. Further support comes from 
Feinberg and Reynolds (2006), who find strong evidence that retaliation is a 
significant factor in explaining the proliferation of worldwide AD filings. 
Another strand of the literature seeks to explore the role of tariff 
liberalization in the use of AD. The main point of these studies is the 
potential substitution between tariff and AD, which is a result of the shift 
towards international competition via trade liberalization and the domestic 
pressures associated with this shift. Aggarwal (2007, pp. 179) shows that a 
decline in mean tariff rates leads to an increase in the total number of AD 
initiations in a country. In addition, Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) found that 
tariff cuts agreed in the Uruguay Round increased the likelihood of observing 
an AD petition. Using applied tariffs, as opposed to the bound tariffs used in 
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Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), Moore and Zanardi (2008) support the 
substitution hypothesis of tariff and AD for the heavy users of AD. Moreover, 
modifying the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), 
Bown and Tovar (2008) find that reduction in tariffs, stemming from India’s 
trade policy reforms in 1990s, is associated with an increase in its AD 
activity, the heaviest AD-user country in recent years. 
In this paper, I examine the role of political ideology and AD activity 
by following the substitution argument of tariff and AD. My theory of 
protection is motivated by the earlier work of DM (2005). Simply put, Stolper-
Samuelson theorem predicts that trade will increase the demand for the 
abundant factor in production and decrease for the scarce one. Therefore, in a 
capital intensive industry, it is the owners of labor who suffer, while capital 
owners gain from a shift towards protection. On the contrary, increased trade 
will benefit capital and hurt labor in labor intensive industries. DM (2005) 
argues that since importable good is the labor intensive one in a capital-rich 
country, an increase in the leftist orientation of the government increases the 
trade barriers in capital abundant countries, and an opposite scenario holds 
for the labor abundant countries. This hypothesis is strongly supported in 
DM (2005) with different types of protection tools such as tariffs, import 
duties and quotas.   
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The main contribution of my study is the integration of AD use to 
examine the relationship between political ideology and protection. Besides, 
we also extend DM’s work with an industry level estimation of tariffs using 
the recently available data of the protection of industries. In line with DM 
(2005), our results indicate that predictions of the partisan trade theory hold 
at the industry level as well. In addition, we empirically investigate how the 
government’s political ideology affects the decision to file an AD petition. This 
also allows us to test the substitution of tariff and AD initiations for the 
domestic industries. Moreover, on the basis of the redistributive effect of 
trade policy, we also check whether the imposition of AD duties shows the 
same pattern as tariffs in terms of partisan preferences of the governments.. 
Furthermore, we conduct a robustness check for the measure of the ideology 
variable, as suggested by DM (2005). Finally, I also test the validity of our 
results addressing the sample selection bias in the set of AD initiations. In 
sum, my results suggest that political ideology of the governments affect the 
level of tariffs, AD filings of the industries as well as the AD duty imposition 
decision of the governments. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I set up a 
theoretical model which provides testable implications for the effect of an 
increase in the leftist bias of the government on the tariff and AD use of 
industries. Section 3 describes the econometric approach and various 
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specifications undertaken in our analysis. In Section 4, we briefly discuss the 
construction of data used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the 
estimation results, and section 6 provides the concluding remarks. 
Theoretical Framework  
In this section we modify the model of DM (2002) to extend it to 
industry level, in order to show the effect of the government’s ideology on 
protection. To do so let us consider an economy with N industries, each of 
which has two kinds of factor owners: workers and capitalists.2 Each good 
produced has a specific tariff of ݐ which generates a tariff revenue of ܶሺݐ) ൌ
ݐ݉ሺ݌) where ݉ሺ݌) denotes the total imports. We assume that the share of 
industry h in total tariff revenue is proportional to its production share in the 
economy and each factor owner receives tariff revenue proportional to their 
factor income share in an industry. Turning to the demand side, we suppose 
that individual preferences are identical and homothetic. An individual i’s 
indirect utility function can, as a result, be written as ߗ௜ ൌ ܫ௜ሺݐ)ܸሺݐ) where 
ܫ௜	is her income. Total incomes of all capitalists and of all workers in industry 
h are given respectively by 
   		ܫ௛௄ሺݐ) ൌ ݎሺݐ)ܭ௛ + ߛߜܶሺݐ)                                                      (1.1)                      
		ܫ௛௅ሺݐ) ൌ ݓሺݐ)ܮ௛ + ߛሺ1 െ ߜ)ܶሺݐ)                                               (1.2)  
                                                            
2 We assume that workers only own labor and capitalists only own capital. 
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where ߛ denotes the production share of industry h and ߜ	denotes the income 
share of capitalists in industry h. ݓሺݐ) and ݎሺݐ) denote the wage rate and the 
rental rate respectively.  
Giving labor welfare the weight of α and capitalist welfare the weight 
of 1- α, the government chooses the level of tariff for industry h to maximize 
its objective function which is given by 
   ߗீሺݐ) ൌ  ߙ∑ ߗ௛௜ + ሺ1 െ ߙ)௜∈௅ ∑ ߗ௛௜௜∈௄                                      (1.3) 
The above objective function can also be written as  
ߗீሺݐ) ൌ ܸሺݐ)ܫ஺ሺݐ)                                                               (1.4) 
where ܫ஺ is the weighted aggregate income given by 
ܫ஺ ൌ ሺ1 + ߬)ܮ௛ሾሺߙ. ݎሺݐ)݇௛ + ሺ1 െ ߙ)ݓሺݐ)ሿ                                     (1.5)                      
where ݇௛	is the capital labor ratio of sector i and ߬ is the ratio of total tariff 
revenue to total income of the economy. 
Letting Iu(t) denote the weighted income for an industry of unit size, 
the government maximizes ܮ௛. ܸሺݐ)ܫ௨ሺݐ) which is also same as maximizing 
Φ ൌ ݑሺݐ) + ψሺt) where ݑሺݐ) ൌ ݈ܸ݊ሺݐ)	and	ψሺt) ൌ lnܫ௨ሺݐ) ൌ ݈݊ሾߙݓሺݐ) +
ሺ1 െ ߙ)ݎሺݐ)݇௛ሿ + lnሺ1 + ߬). We assume that this objective function satisfies the 
second order condition for a unique solution. The first order condition for 
government’s maximization problem is 
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	ݑᇱሺݐ) + డటడ௧ ൌ 0                                                    (1.6) 
Let ݐ∗	be the equilibrium protection here which maximizes the government’s 
objective function. The key question is that how this protection level changes 
with the ideology of the government. The answer comes from differentiating 
the first order condition with respect to α, the weight government attaches on 
labor welfare. An increase in α can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist 
orientation of the government. By differentiating the first order condition we 
obtain 
డ௧∗
డఈ ൌ
ሾ௥ᇲሺ௧)௪ሺ௧)ି௥ሺ௧)௪ᇲሺ௧)ሿ௞೓
ሾఈ௪ሺ௧)ାሺଵିఈ)௥ሺ௧)௞೓ሿమሾ௩ᇲᇲሺ௧)ାడమట/డ௧మሿ                          (1.7) 
Given the fact that protection is beneficial for the owners of the factor which 
is used intensively in the production of the importable, we have ݎᇱሺݐ) ൐ 0 and 
ݓ′ሺݐ) ൏ 0 for a capital intensive industry, whereas ݎᇱሺݐ) ൏ 0 and ݓᇱሺݐ) ൐ 0 for 
a labor intensive industry. Due to the concavity assumption imposed, the 
denominator of the above derivative is always negative. Consequently, we 
have ∂t*/ ∂α > 0 for labor intensive industries, while ∂t*/ ∂α < 0 for capital 
intensive industries. 
Since tariff is the major protection tool, the first proposition is that an 
increase in the leftist bias of the government leads to an increase in the 
tariffs for labor intensive industries. In addition, we argue that antidumping 
is a substitute policy instrument for the industries which do not receive 
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adequate protection via tariffs and the probability of observing an 
antidumping initiation decreases for the labor intensive industries with an 
increase in the government’s leftist bias.  
Econometric Methodology and Data 
Our empirical analysis includes three sections in which we analyze the 
effect of political ideology on the tariff levels of the industries, the probability 
of industry level AD investigations, and the probability of an affirmative AD 
decision by government AD agencies, respectively.  
 Estimation of Industry Level Tariffs  
Here we take a further step following DM (2005) and MJ (2004) and 
analyze the link between the governments’ political partisanship and tariffs 
at the industry level. The theory outlined above predicts that there is a 
positive relationship between the left-wing ideology of the government and 
tariff for the industries with low (ܭ/ܮ) given the fact that left-wing 
governments tend to redistribute income via policies to benefit labor. To test 
this prediction we estimate the following linear model:   
ܶݎ௜௛௧ ൌ ߚ଴ +	ߚଵܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ + ߚଶܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ ∗ ܭ ܮ⁄ ௜௛௧ + ߚଷ ܭ ܮ⁄ ௜௛௧ + ܼ௜௛௧ߠ + ߝ௜௛௧          
(1.8)                      
where ܶݎ௜௛௧ denotes the weighted applied tariff level of three-digit ISIC 
industry h in country i, ሺܭ ܮ⁄ )௜௛ is the capital-labor ratio of the industry, 
12 
 
ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ denotes the degree of the government’s leftist bias and ܼ௜௛௧	is a 
vector of control variables.3 Differentiating equation (8) with respect to 
ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜ we have   
డ்௔௥௜௙௙೔೓೟
డூௗ௘௢௟௢௚௬೔೟ ൌ ߚଵ + ߚଶ ∗ ሺܭ ܮ⁄ )௜௛௧                                  (1.9) 
The testable implication here is that ߚଵ ൐ 0 and 	ߚଶ ൏ 0 as pointed out 
in the theoretical model.  
We also consider several control variables in our specifications. The 
first one is the share of industry output in total GDP which is related to the 
campaign contributions provided to the government elections in Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) model. We believe that industries with higher output 
share have higher ability to be politically organized and to lobby for 
protection. In addition, the competition from imports and the change in the 
total production of the industry would affect the protection level of the 
industry. To control for this effect, we use the average import and output 
growth of the industry in the last three years. We also control for the 
macroeconomic variables such as the percentage change in exchange rate, 
growth rate of GDP and the current account. All of these macroeconomic 
variables might be associated with the pressure against free trade. Following 
DM (2005), we also include the democracy level given the fact that politicians 
                                                            
3 We use the natural logs of capital-labor ratios as in Dutt and Mitra (2005). Besides, this 
variable is lagged one period in all specifications of our empirical analysis to avoid the 
potential endogeneity between capital-labor ratio and protection.      
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in democratic regime are more prone to pursue policies in favor of their 
electoral base. Moreover, we control for the WTO membership and the years 
of WTO membership of the country to capture the effect of WTO 
commitments and their trend on tariffs. Finally, we include country and 
three digit ISIC industry fixed effects to control for the unobservable country 
and industry specific variations.                   
Estimation of Antidumping Initiations 
To empirically test the effect of partisanship on AD activity, linear 
probability model is used to estimate a country’s three digit ISIC industry’s 
decision of filing an AD petition.4 To do so, we aggregate the data on AD 
investigations from case-level to industry-level by matching the data on six-
digit Harmonized System product level AD information to data on production 
of three-digit ISIC industries. Our baseline model is: 
ܲሺݕଵ௜௛௧ ൌ 1) ൌ φሺ߶଴ + ߶ଵܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ + ߶ଶܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ ∗ ሺܭ/ܮ)௜௛௧ + ߶ଷሺܭ/ܮ)௜௛௧ +
߶4ߤ݅ℎݐ+ߝ)݅ℎݐ                                                                                                   
(1.10)                                                                                                          
where ݕ	takes on a value of 1 if the industry filed at least one AD 
investigation in the given year and zero otherwise.5 Similar to the tariff 
equation, we have the ideology, capital-labor ratio and their interaction in the 
                                                            
4 Another strategy would be to use the number of AD filings as the dependent variable. 
However, it is impossible to find a predictor to separate the sampling and structural zeros in 
the dependent variable. See, Aggarwal (2007) for the same argument. 
5 Bown (2008) uses the same dependent variable and applies the same aggregation strategy 
combining the same data sources used in this paper. 
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AD model. However, the expected signs of the coefficients for ideology 
variable and the interaction term are reversed because of the substitution 
argument of antidumping and tariffs. We hypothesize that an increase in the 
leftist orientation of the government makes labor intensive industries, which 
already received higher protection via tariffs, less likely to pursue an 
antidumping investigation.  
We control for various other factors following the AD literature. For 
instance, WTO rules require domestic firms to provide evidence that dumping 
takes place on the one hand and the industry is materially injured on the 
other (WTO, 1995; Article 2.1 and 3.4). To control for these considerations, we 
include the average output and import growth of the industry in the last 
three years. The likelihood of filing an AD petition should increase with the 
fall in production and with more competition from imports. We also believe 
that industries with higher output have more ability to file an AD petition 
because of the fact that it is easier for them to cover the fixed costs associated 
with filing an AD initiation and follow the necessary process of an AD 
investigation. Consequently, we control for the share of industry output in a 
country’s total GDP to capture the lobbying and the financial power of that 
particular industry. Following Francois and Niels (2006) and Knetter and 
Prusa (2003), we also control for macroeconomic indicators such as GDP 
growth, percentage change in the value of exchange rate and the current 
15 
 
account balance. We are more likely to find an AD petition in periods of 
exchange rate appreciation, current account deficits and economic recession. 
In addition, as noted in Bown (2008), 1995 inception of WTO resulted in a 
common set of rules which are binding for all WTO members. Therefore, we 
also control for the WTO membership and the years of WTO membership to 
see the effect of WTO rules and enforcements and their trend on industries’ 
AD activity. Moreover, although the primary interest of this paper is to 
investigate the effect of political ideology on tariff and AD, including applied 
tariff as a control variable in the model of AD initiations also leads us to 
contribute to the earlier works of Moore and Zanardi (2008), Feinberg and 
Reynolds (2007) and Bown and Tovar (2008) which investigate the role of 
tariff liberalization in the face of the spread of antidumping usage.6 Finally, 
similar to the tariff equation, we also control for the democracy level in the 
countries.                 
Estimation of Antidumping Outcomes 
We now turn our focus to the AD duty imposition decisions of AD 
authorities. National governments, when undertaking the AD process, seek 
considerable economic evidence on two issues: (1) whether there is 
international price discrimination, where the price of an exported good is less 
than its “fair value” in the market of the exporting country and (2) whether 
                                                            
6 Following Zanardi (2008), we lag the applied tariff one period.  
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this unfair pricing causes injury to the domestic market. Having reviewed the 
filings, AD authorities impose extra duties on the particular good in order to 
bring the value of the good closer to its fair value.  
In order to quantify the effect of government’s ideology on the 
affirmative AD outcome, we carry out a case-level estimation and pool the 
data of all AD investigations In addition, owing to the raw data of product 
level information on AD investigations, the case-level analysis enables us to 
include the six-digit Harmonized System tariff when providing an answer to 
the question whether tariff and antidumping duties are substitute or 
complement policy instruments from the perspective of the governments. The 
following linear probability model is estimated: 
ܲሺݕଶ௜௖௧ ൌ 1) ൌ ηሺߛ଴ + ߛଵܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ + ߛଶܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜௧ ∗ ሺܭ/ܮ)௜௛௧ + ߛଷሺܭ/ܮ)௜௛௧ +
ߛସߤ௜௛ݐ + ߝ௜௛௧)                                                                                                   (1.11)                       
where the binary dependent variable ଶܻ௜௖௧ is 1 if government authorities 
decide affirmatively  to a specific AD case from industry h and zero for all 
other outcomes such as negative, withdrawn and terminated. It should be 
noted that the ideology variable in (11) denotes the ideology of the 
government at the time of the final injury decision. Our hypothesis is that 
left-wing governments, which tend to increase the returns to labor, are more 
likely to decide affirmatively for AD cases of the industries that are labor 
intensive. Therefore, the predicted signs of the ideology variable and the 
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interaction term are positive and negative respectively, as are in the tariff 
equation.  
A serious problem in estimation AD outcomes is that the expected 
value of the dependent variable, the outcome of the AD petition, affects the 
sample size. This creates a potential sample selection bias in the set of AD 
initiations when we estimate the AD outcomes.7 As shown in Blonigen (2006), 
when deciding to file a petition, firms evaluate the decision rule where 
expected gains from filing a petition is greater than the fixed  cost of filing. 
Therefore, firms pursue an AD petition only if   
	ܧ∗ ൌ ݌. ߨ െ ݂ ൐ 0                                                       (1.12) 
where ݌ denotes the expected probability of an affirmative AD decision, ߨ	 
denotes the expected gain from a successful outcome and ݂ denotes the fixed 
cost associated with filing a petition. Therefore, industries with smaller 
output share are less likely to follow an AD investigation because of the fixed 
cost involved. In order to remedy this potential sample selection bias, we also 
estimate AD outcomes using the Heckman (1979) selection model. The 
outcome equation for the governments’ decision to impose duty becomes   
ݕଶ௜௛௧ ൌ ݔ௜௛௧ߠ + ݑଵ                                              (1.13) 
                                                            
7 Hansen (1990) and Bown (2006) also address the sample selection bias in the set of AD 
investigations.    
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However, ଶܻ௜௛௧	is not observed for the industries for which the expected 
gain of the successful outcome does not exceed the fixed cost of filing 
associated with a petition. Our assumption is that ଶܻ௜௛௧ is only observed if  
ݓ௜௛௧ߠ + ݑଶ ൐ 0                                             (1.14) 
In the Heckman selection model ݔ௜௛ and ݓ௜௛ are the vectors of 
explanatory variables to be estimated. Further, we assume that  
                   		ቀݑଵ	ݑଶ	ቁ~ܰ ൜	ቀ
0
0ቁ , ൤
1 ߩ
ߩ 1൨	ൠ                                       (1.15) 
Separate estimation of AD outcomes will yield biased estimates for the 
parameters, if	ߩ ് 0. The Heckman model offers an estimation strategy which 
corrects the sample selection bias by treating the industries’ decision to file 
an AD petition as the first stage selection equation and the governments’ AD 
duty imposition decision as the second stage outcome equation.    
In addition to all control variables in the previous AD analysis, the 
selection equation of the Heckman model has to contain at least one variable, 
which is not included in the outcome equation, to identify the selection 
equation. For this purpose, we use the number of establishments (NEST) in 
each industry, a proxy for firm concentration in the first stage selection 
equation. Studies such as Rodrik (1995) and Reynolds (2006) argue that it is 
harder for industries with more firms, or less concentration, to overcome the 
free rider problem to file a petition. On the other hand, an increase in the 
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number of firms might be associated with an increase in the probability of 
observing AD investigations for the industries which is highly concentrated 
due to the competitive effect of such an increase on the price levels. This calls 
for modeling a possible non-linearity between the number of establishments 
and AD filings, which we do by adding a quadratic term of this variable in the 
first stage selection equation.  
Data  
We collected the data of output, import, gross fixed capital formation, 
number of workers, number of establishments and the tariff data of 28 three-
digit ISIC industries from World Bank Trade, Production and Protection 
(TPP) database (Nicita and Olerreaga, 2006). The tariff variable we employ is 
the import weighted average applied tariffs for the 28 three-digit ISIC 
industries. Following the convention, the capital stocks (ܭ) of industries are 
calculated from investment series by the perpetual inventory equation: 
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ܫ௧ + ሺ1 െ ߜ)ܭ௧                                      (1.16) 
where ܫ௧ is the gross fixed capital formation and ߜ is the depreciation rate.8 
The initial capital stock (ܭ଴) is computed as		ܫ଴/ሺߜ + ݃), where ݃ is the 
average geometric growth rate for the first ten years of available data. 9   
                                                            
8 The depreciation rate is assumed to be 0.06. 
9 See Caselli (2004). 
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The data on product-level AD investigations and outcomes are 
obtained from Global Antidumping Database Version 5.0 (Bown, 2009) which 
provides detailed product-level information on AD filings and outcomes. This 
database provides the date of the initiation and final decision of AD case, the 
target country, the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes 
of the products subject to filings. For industry level estimation, we matched 
the data on AD investigations at the six-digit Harmonized System product 
level to data on production in three-digit ISIC industries. For the case-level 
analysis, we pooled the data on all AD investigations and assigned each 
observation its three-digit ISIC code using the concordances in the TPP 
database.    
For the political ideology variable, we utilize the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al., 2008), which is updated annually and includes data 
for the period 1975 through 2006. This database provides qualitative 
information on the political position of the executive power for each country, 
in the form of leftist, centrist and rightist ideologies. Our continuous ideology 
variable, whose increase can be interpreted as an increase in the leftist 
orientation, takes on a value of 1, 2 and 3 for the right-wing, center-wing and 
left-wing governments respectively.10 For the democracy index, we use 
                                                            
10 While we do not report in the paper, we also tried assigning a dummy variable for each 
ideology category and running the regressions with that measure in order to test for the 
robustness of the results. Our findings are insensitive to different treatment of the ideology 
measure.  
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Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Freedom House’s publication which 
was published in 1972 and reports the data on civil liberties and political 
rights for 193 countries. The democracy (political rights) index is such that 
more democratic countries are assigned a lower score than less democratic 
countries on a scale of 1 to 7.  We reversed the scores by subtracting each 
score from 8 so that more democratic countries take higher scores. 
The data on WTO membership come from WTO website and the data 
on tariff of six-digit Harmonized System products are obtained from 
UNCTAD’s TRAINS database which is accessed through The World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software developed by the World Bank. 
Finally, we use the database of United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Economic Research Service for the data of exchange rate and World 
Development Indicators, 2005 for the data of GDP growth and the current 
account. 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provide the descriptive statistics and the data 
sources for the industry level and case-level analysis, respectively. We 
construct a balanced panel for the tariff and the AD estimations, which 
covers the time period between 1986 and 2001. However, the availability of 
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the tariff, investment and labor data in TPP determines the sample of our 
analysis.11  
Results  
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results of equation (8).  Specification 
(1) reports the results without any controls and fixed effects. Specification (2) 
includes political, macroeconomic and other industry controls. Specifications 
(3) documents the estimates when fixed effects are also included for the 
unobservable country or/and industry variations. Focusing first on the 
variables of interest in Table 1.3, we see that the coefficient of the ideology 
variable and the coefficient of the interaction term are positive and negative 
respectively. Both of them are also statistically significant in all 
specifications. As shown, there is a positive relationship between the level of 
tariffs and the government’s leftist orientation for low levels of capital-labor 
ratio. As the capital-labor ratio increases, the negative interaction term 
dominates the positive ideology coefficient.   
In terms of control variables, consistent with the political influence 
hypothesis, higher output share of the industry is associated with lower 
tariffs. However, output and import growth of the industry are insignificant 
                                                            
11 The reason why we do not include the European Union (EU) countries is that AD decisions 
in the European Union are evaluated by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission 
which makes it ambiguous to analyze which country’s ideology matters. In addition, as 
provided by Global AD database (Bown, 2009), firms from different countries jointly file in 
most of the AD cases of the EU. Furthermore, Indonesia is excluded from our sample because 
the ideologies of the political parties of Indonesia are unspecified in DPI database.   
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when fixed effects are included. The growth rate of GDP has a significant 
positive effect on the industry tariff, which implies that it is easier for 
governments to increase the tariffs in a period of economic growth, reason 
being that the increase in prices hurts consumers less than it does in a period 
of recession. However, the other two macroeconomic factors, current account 
and exchange rate, has no significant effect on tariffs. In addition, the effect 
of democracy on trade liberalization is positive in our preferred specification 
in which we have country and industry fixed effects. This finding also 
supports the earlier work of Milner and Kubota (2005) which shows that 
reduced trade barriers are associated with a movement toward democracy.12. 
Finally, the WTO membership reduced the tariffs but the coefficient estimate 
of the “years of WTO membership” suggests that the liberalization effect of 
the WTO decreases as each year passes.  
Turning to the industries’ decision to file an AD investigation, we 
report the estimates of the linear probability model in equation (10) in Table 
1.4. Specifications (1) shows the results without any controls but the control 
variables and fixed effects are included in all other specifications. As opposed 
to results in Table 1.3, the negative coefficient of the ideology variable and 
the positive coefficient of the interaction term in all specifications support our 
prediction that the likelihood of an industry’s decision to pursue an AD 
investigation decreases for labor intensive industries when the government’s 
                                                            
12 Milner and Kubota (2005) use a different proxy for democracy. 
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leftist orientation increases. The rationale behind this finding is that an 
increase in the leftist orientation of the government makes labor intensive 
industries, which receive higher protection via tariffs, less likely to file an AD 
petition. The reversed signs of the ideology and its interaction in Tables 1.3 
and 1.4 also go along with the substitution hypothesis between trade 
liberalization and AD use. Once again, the significance of the ideology 
variable and the interaction term is insensitive to inclusion of control 
variables and fixed effects. 
In accordance with the lobbying and financial power argument, 
industries with higher output share are more likely to file an AD 
investigation. Besides, with respect to the WTO requirements, an increase in 
industry output is associated with a decrease in the probability of observing 
an AD initiation for an industry. Both the output share and the output 
growth are significant in all specifications. In addition, consistent with the 
previous studies in AD literature, appreciation of the local currency, the 
periods of economic recession and current account deficit are associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of AD use. However, we do not find any 
significant effect of import growth of the industry on AD filings when 
controlling for country and industry fixed effects. Moreover, increase in the 
democratization of the country makes domestic firms more likely to pursue 
an AD investigation. This can be attributed to the higher expected probability 
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of wining an AD case because of better institutions in a democratic regime. 
This result might also implicate that industries in democratic countries have 
easier access to the government agencies which reduces their filing costs 
associated with an AD petition. The liberalization efforts of democracies 
might also rush industries toward filing AD cases. The positive sign of the 
coefficient on the WTO membership shows the triggering effect of common set 
of AD rules on the industries’ AD initiations after the 1995 inception of WTO. 
On the other hand, the estimate of years of WTO membership shows that the 
effect of WTO on industries’ AD filings was higher in the first years of its 
inception and this effect is decreasing over time.  
We now turn to the results of government’s decision to impose AD 
duty. In Table 1.5, we report the estimates when the data of product level AD 
information is pooled and each observation is matched with its three-digit 
ISIC code. The availability of the six-digit HS tariff data determines the 
sample size here. In line with the earlier discussion, the positive estimate of 
the ideology variable and the negative estimate of interaction term 
demonstrate that an increase in the leftist bias of the government is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative outcome for the 
industries operating at low capital-labor ratio. The estimations of 
governments’ decision to impose AD duty result in the same pattern of signs 
for the variables of interest both in tariff and AD outcome equations. In terms 
of control variables, we find that petitions from larger industries are 
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associated with a higher probability of a successful outcome. Consistent with 
the WTO’s requirements, industries facing more competition from imports 
are more likely to grant AD protection, as well as the industries experiencing 
a depression in production. Finally, we do not find a significant effect of the 
macroeconomic determinants on the probability of observing a successful AD 
case. 
Tables 1.6 documents the results of the Heckman selection model 
where the first stage is the industries’ decision to file an AD petition and the 
second stage is the governments’ AD duty imposition outcome whether it is 
affirmative. Once again, the primary variables of interest are ideology 
measure and its interactions. Despite the small variation in the dependent 
variable in the second stage, the estimates in column (2) of Table 1.6 support 
the results we obtained in the separate estimations of AD outcomes. 
Moreover, the altered sign of the ideology variable and its interaction in the 
first and second stage is in line with the previous findings of AD 
investigations. The number of establishments which is used to identify the 
selection model is also significant in both tables. The coefficients on the 
variables NEST and NEST2 imply that an increase in the number of firms in 
the industry is associated with an increase in the probability of observing an 
AD investigation for smaller industries. However the negative coefficient of 
the quadratic term, NEST2, indicates that very large industries are less likely 
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to file an AD petition.13 This inverted-U shaped relationship between the firm 
concentration and AD filings implies that the competition effect which is a 
consequence of an increase in the number of firms creates an incentive for the 
firms to file an AD petition; however, as the number of firms keeps 
increasing, the free rider problem dominates such incentives. In addition, 
firms might be reluctant to file a petition in that case given the fact that per 
firm benefit of a successful outcome will be reduced for very large 
industries.14 In addition to all these points, the same signs for the coefficients 
of the ideology variable and its interactions both in tariff and AD outcome 
models imply that tariff and antidumping duties are complements in terms of 
governments’ trade policy. Therefore, the redistribution argument from 
capital to labor due to the pro-labor policies of left-wing government is 
supported both in the models of tariff and AD duty imposition.          
Conclusion 
To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine the effect 
of political ideology of the governments on AD protection. Following the 
political economy literature which addresses the effect of partisan 
preferences of governments on trade policy, we first show evidence that the 
predictions of the ideology based model of trade protection is also supported 
                                                            
13 We also tried excluding the quadratic term in the selection equation. However, it resulted 
in insignificant estimate of the number of establishments. 
  
14 See Reynolds (2006). 
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at the industry level. Consistent with the redistributive mechanism of 
protection, we find that an increase in the leftist extent of the government 
increases the returns to labor which in turns increases the tariff of the labor 
intensive industries. Besides, matching the data on three-digit ISIC 
industries’ production and protection with the detailed product level 
information on AD filings, we demonstrate that in the periods of left wing 
governments, an increase in the labor intensity of the industry is associated 
with a decrease in the likelihood of observing an AD initiation from that 
industry, which already grants higher protection in the form of tariffs. The 
substitutability of tariff and AD usage is supported not only with this result 
but also with the robust negative effect of applied tariffs on the probability of 
AD filings. In addition, our results suggest the effect of political ideology on 
the governments’ decision to impose AD duty. The empirical results of both 
separate estimation and two-stage Heckman model, which corrects the 
potential sample selection bias, confirm that the probability of a successful 
AD investigation increases in labor intensity of that industry when there is a 
left-wing government in power. Our last finding also speaks to the 
complementarity of tariff and AD duties from the governments’ view. Our 
results are robust to controlling for country and industry fixed effects and 
also insensitive to controlling for several factors which is pointed out in the 
existing literature. 
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Table. 1.1 Summary Statistics (Industry level) 
 
- * variable scaled down by 106 
- § Average percentage change, three years before t. 
- ˜ indicates the summary statistics when AD initiation=1 
 
 
Variable Mean Max Min Standard deviation N 
AD  Initiation 0.096 1 0 0.295 3500
AD affirmative˜ 0.724 1 0  0.447 338 
Ideology 1.936 3 1 0.927 3500
K/L (log) 10.161 16.629 4.702 1.257 3355
Output share 0.936 13.228 0.001 1.331 3318
Output growth§ 0.091 4.820 0.613 0.186 3402
Import growth§ 0.508 180.498 0.986 5.562 3472
GDP growth 4.090 12.822 -11.7 3.941 3500
Exchange rate 0.950 69.458 0.151 6.460 3472
Current account* 24.656 40.371 -413.442 65.385 3500
Number of establishments 1795 95664 1 4.269 2752
WTO membership 0.384 1 0 0.486 3500
Years of WTO membership 1.392 7 0 2.109 3500
Democracy 5.576 7 2 1.292 3500
Tariff (3 digit) 12.499 337.16 0 19.288 1544
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Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics (Case level) 
 
- * variable scaled down by 10 
- § Average percentage change, three years before t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Max Min Standard deviation N 
AD affirmative 0.596 1 0  0.490 1328
Ideology 1.711 3 1 0.946 1328
K/L (log) 11.102 13.157 8.276 0.932 1249
Output share 1.598 12.357 0.022 1.590 1246
Output growth§ 0.047 1.908 -0.561 0.179 1242
Import growth§ 0.080 4.033 -0.507 0.270 1324
GDP growth 3.307 9.486 -6.854 2.989 1328
Exchange rate 0.092 1.638 - 0.157 6.460 1328
Current account* -60.680 40.371 -413.442 102.243 1328
WTO membership 0.427 1 0 0.494 1328
Years of WTO membership 1.878 7 0 2.506 1328
Democracy 6.190 7 3 1.240 1328
Tariff (6 digit) 12.585 65 0 11.654 998 
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TABLE 1.3. Regression Estimates of  Three-Digit ISIC Tariff 
    (1)    (2)       (3) 
    
Ideologyit 35.487 33.614 15.737 
 (3.67)*** (3.42)*** (2.47)** 
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht -3.111 -2.737 -1.182 
 (3.53)*** (3.06)*** (2.03)** 
(K/L)iht 0.478 0.702 -1.529 
 (0.43) (0.62) (0.97) 
Political 
determinants 
   
Output share  -0.933 -0.600 
  (2.66)*** (2.37)** 
Import growth  0.076 0.014 
  (3.98)*** (0.73) 
Output growth   -0.051 -0.058 
  (0.03) (0.76) 
WTO membership  -22.140 -8.237 
  (5.01)*** (4.09)*** 
Years of WTO 
membership 
 1.597 0.349 
  (4.81)*** (2.00)** 
Democracy  -0.129 -2.507 
  (0.26) (3.45)*** 
Macroeconomic 
factors 
   
GDP growth  0.916 0.570 
  (5.98)*** (6.38)*** 
Exchange rate  -2.470 0.500 
  (1.49) (0.52) 
Current Account  0.033 0.007 
  (1.10) (1.15) 
    
Country fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 1426 1329 1329 
    
   Tables: 1.3 – 1.6:  ***, **, * show the level of significance in 99%, 95% and 90% 
respectively 
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Table 1.4. Linear Probability Model – AD Filings 
 
 
                Binary dependent variable =1 if the industry filed an AD petition 
 
                                  
 
      
    (1)    (2)       (3) (4) 
     
Ideologyit -0.077 -0.103 -0.142 -0.142 
 (2.18)** (2.78)*** (3.50)*** (2.07)** 
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.016 
 (2.37)** (2.99)*** (3.47)*** (2.40)** 
(K/L)iht -0.003 -0.026 -0.035 -0.039 
 (0.32) (3.06)*** (3.94)*** (2.92)*** 
Political determinants     
Output share  0.031 0.026 0.037 
  (5.81)*** (3.81)*** (3.87)*** 
Import growth  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (4.97)*** (0.32) (0.21) 
Output growth   -0.035 -0.048 -0.035 
  (1.70)* (2.29)** (1.77)* 
WTO membership  0.222 0.186 0.019 
  (3.83)*** (3.24)*** (0.18) 
Years of WTO membership  -0.027 -0.023 -0.003 
  (5.11)*** (4.50)*** (0.29) 
Democracy  0.015 0.014 0.010 
  (3.24)*** (2.03)** (0.76) 
Macroeconomic factors     
GDP growth  -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 
  (5.14)*** (2.20)** (1.06) 
Exchange rate  -0.030 -0.031 0.001 
  (2.53)** (2.18)** (0.02) 
Current Account  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (1.72)* (2.81)*** (3.09)*** 
     
Tariff (3 digit)    -0.001 
    (1.66)* 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3022 2954 2954 1425 
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TABLE 1.5. Linear Probability Model – AD Decisions 
                                  
                              Binary dependent variable =1 if the government imposed 
AD duty 
 
    (1)    (2)       (3) 
    
Ideologyit 0.385 1.025 0.735 
 (1.93)* (3.71)*** (2.20)** 
Ideologyit * (K/L)iht -0.037 -0.086 -0.062 
 (2.07)** (3.57)*** (2.10)** 
(K/L)iht 0.041 0.118 0.001 
 (0.98) (2.08)** (0.01) 
Political 
determinants 
   
Output share  0.024 0.025 
  (1.88)* (1.72)* 
Import growth  0.094 0.141 
  (1.38) (1.87)* 
Output growth   -0.752 -0.587 
  (4.80)*** (3.29)*** 
WTO membership  -0.108 -0.082 
  (1.31) (0.95) 
Years of WTO 
membership 
 0.066 0.102 
  (2.03)** (2.57)** 
Democracy  0.026 0.046 
  (0.84) (0.50) 
Macroeconomic 
factors 
   
GDP growth  0.005 -0.006 
  (0.43) (0.55) 
Exchange rate  0.027 -0.114 
  (0.14) (0.58) 
Current Account  0.000 0.000 
  (0.43) (0.52) 
    
Tariff (6 digit)  0.006 0.010 
  (1.91)* (2.52)** 
Country fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 1195 898 898 
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TABLE 1.6. Heckman Selection Model of Antidumping  Investigations and 
Outcomes 
 
  
Stage 1 
Selection Equation 
Binary dependent 
variable=1 
if industry files an 
AD petition 
 
Stage 2 
Regression Equation 
Binary dependent variable=1 
if government imposes AD 
measure 
Ideology -0.931   1.231  
 (1.67)*   (1.67)*  
Ideology * K/L 0.108   -0.141  
 (2.14)**   (2.07)**  
K/L -0.292   0.202  
 (2.39)**   (1.68)*  
Output share 0.174   0.023  
 (4.13)***   (0.35)  
Import growth 0.097   0.718  
 (1.28)   (3.39)***  
Output growth -0.450   -0.907  
 (1.03)   (2.22)**  
WTO membership -1.058   2.200  
 (0.56)   (1.89)*  
Years of WTO membership 0.063   -0.164  
 (0.32)   (1.44)  
Democracy 0.044   -0.154  
 (0.34)   (1.10)  
GDP growth -0.098   -0.074  
 (2.40)**   (2.16)**  
Exchange rate -0.333   -1.509  
 (0.46)   (2.77)***  
Current account -0.000   0.000  
 (1.45)   (1.20)  
Tariff (3 digit) -0.033   0.013  
 (5.28)***   (1.00)  
NEST 0.064     
 (2.27)***     
NEST2 -0.006     
 (2.42)**     
Country fixed effect Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effect Yes   Yes  
Observations 1030   159  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ANATOMY OF TRADE DEFLECTION 
Introduction 
Antidumping (AD) has become a favorite remedy for the firms which 
seek protection. These preferences have increased especially after the 
substantial tariff liberalization countries have undergone after the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)’s rules and enforcements. Most tariffs are 
governed by trade agreements; however countries can receive protection by 
the use of alternative safeguards. Among these alternative protection 
instruments, AD has become the most frequently used and the most 
influential one.15 Today, more than 40 members of the WTO have 
implemented AD law and they filed more than 4,000 cases in the last 20 
years.  
Ideally, AD aims to prevent predatory dumping, a situation where 
international price discrimination drives the domestic firms out of the 
market. However, because of the imperfect observability of fair and unfair 
pricing, it is hard to identify whether AD duties are motivated by dumping or 
                                                            
15 Antidumping duties, which are defined in GATT Article VI, are easier to use compared to 
other safeguards such as emergency protection of a threatened industry (GATT Article XIX), 
exceptions for health or safety concerns (GATT Article XX) and restrictions for national 
security (GATT Article XXI). 
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by the domestic pressures towards protection. Much of the evidence suggests 
that AD protection is abused to protect inefficient import competing firms.16 
Similar to other discriminatory adjustments in trade policy, AD duties 
not only affect the trade flows of the named and the duty imposer country but 
also affect the trade flows of the third countries.17 This effect can occur in the 
form of trade diversion, a change in the source of origin for a country's 
imports caused by a change in importer’s trade policy, or in the form of trade 
deflection, a change in the destination of exports due to an increase in trade 
restriction imposed in a particular export market. One of the more well-
known pieces of evidence on trade diversion is from Prusa (2001) who shows 
that US imposition of an AD duty increases the imports from the countries 
which are not named in the investigation. Ganguli (2008) and Konings et al. 
(2001) also arrive at the same conclusion analyzing the AD investigations of 
India and European Union respectively. The idea of trade deflection in the 
AD literature, on the other hand, was first introduced by Bown and Crowley 
(henceforth BC) (2007). In their product-level analysis, they find that US 
imposition of import restrictions in the form of an AD duty resulted in 
Japanese exports surging to non-US countries. Their findings suggest that 
                                                            
16 See Konings and Vandenbusche (2008) and Aggarwal (2007). 
 
17 A ‘discriminatory’ trade policy is the one in which a country imposes different trade 
restrictions to imports from different exporting countries. Two examples in this category are 
the preferential trade agreements and antidumping duties. On the contrary, a 
‘nondiscriminatory’ trade policy is the one that is applied equally to all importers. 
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exporters which suffer discriminatory trade restrictions in a country strive to 
find alternative markets to sell their products.  
This study employs a unique three dimensional Brazilian firm-level 
data of exports between 1994 and 2000 to investigate the effect of AD duties, 
which targets Brazilian exporters, on the trade flows of the targeted firms to 
alternative markets in order to pave the way for a more detailed exploration 
of trade deflection which has become an important issue in the WTO and 
other Custom Unions’ framework. We believe that analyzing the firm-level 
responses of AD duties on trade deflection will give us a better understanding 
of which destinations are potential export markets to deflect trade for the 
firms whose products are targeted by AD measures. Special attention is given 
to the ongoing debate in the international trade literature about the role of 
sunk start-up costs in the export market and the previous trading 
relationship of the firms. We investigate whether this past trading 
relationships to different countries affect trade deflection. Our analysis not 
only focuses on the intensive margin, increase in the volume of deflected 
trade arising from existing exporter-product combinations, but also on the 
extensive margin, increase in the new exporter-product combinations in 
alternative markets.   
One of the outcomes associated with trade deflection is that a third 
country, which experiences a substantial import growth, might face pressure 
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to react with a trade remedy of its own. For instance, as noted in BC (2007), 
the imposition of safeguard protection on steel products by European Union 
(EU), Chile, China, Czech Republic, Hungary and Venezuela between 2002 
and 2003 stemmed from the earlier safeguards imposed by the US on steel. 
These countries believed that increase in the import restrictions of steel 
industry in the US lead to a gravitation of steel to their domestic market 
from the rest of the World. Hence, trade deflection contributes to the 
proliferation of worldwide AD filings, which in turns causes a depression in 
global trade. Moreover, World Trade Organization (WTO) section 16.8 allows 
a WTO member to impose a “China safeguard” on a product imported from 
China if the same product has already been targeted by another WTO 
member. Although this China-specific radical section is built on the threat 
that one country’s imposition of import restriction against China deflects 
Chinese exports to alternative markets, empirical findings in BC (2010) 
suggest no systematic evidence of trade deflection for Chinese products 
targeted by US AD duties. Another concern associated with trade deflection 
is the practice of deliberately exporting goods to one country through a 
transit country in order to avoid import taxes. To guard against this type of 
exporting behavior, countries engaging in regional trade agreements use 
protocols for intra-regional trade in order to make sure that particular 
product originates from within the region.18 
                                                            
18 See, Article 12 of The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
39 
 
As there is no evidence of  trade deflection at the product-level in 
China, BC (2010) also mentions that this could relate to the fact that China is 
a “new” entrant to the global trading system and Chinese firms have not yet 
set up necessary networks to deflect trade to alternate markets.19 However 
plausible their argument is, the product-level feature of their dataset does 
not allow them to explore the linkage between firms’ previous exporting 
status in different markets and trade deflection. It is highly likely that 
Japanese firms which were serving more markets compared to their Chinese 
counterparts could deflect their trade to alternative destinations. In addition, 
some Chinese firms might have deflected their shipments to some of their 
trading partners, which would not be captured when the exports are 
aggregated to product level. In the presence of sunk start-up costs of 
exporting, it is difficult for the exporters to sell their products in alternative 
markets if they have not setup ongoing trading relationships in multiple 
markets. This argument is impossible to analyze without breaking down the 
firm exports by exported products and export destinations. In this regard, our 
rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore the variation in exports 
within firm across different destinations when there is a change in trade 
barrier for a particular product.     
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 China granted membership in the WTO in 2001 and BC (2010) investigates the pre-
accession period of China to WTO. 
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It should be highlighted that AD duties provide a useful way of 
examining trade deflection. Antidumping duties yield substantial changes in 
trade flows given the fact that they are on average 10 to 20 times higher than 
the most favored nation (MFN) tariffs.20 Besides, AD duty is a product and a 
market specific trading cost for a firm. For example, if Mexican AD agencies 
impose an AD duty on Brazilian cotton shirt exporters, neither the other 
textile shirt exporters of Brazil nor the cotton shirt exporters of Argentina 
will be affected by this discriminatory policy adjustment. Hence, if a firm 
sells multiple products to a destination, it burdens paying AD duties only for 
that particular product which is targeted by the importer country. Since our 
analysis is based on attractive source of variation in the value of exports 
within firm-product combinations across export destinations, these product 
specific shocks for the firms in different export markets perfectly fits 
perfectly into our research question. Alongside this, Brazil is a well-suited 
country for such an analysis for number of reasons. First, as mentioned 
earlier, highly disaggregated firm-level data of Brazilian exports makes 
Brazil an outstanding case for this research. Second, Brazilian exported 
products were frequently targeted by AD duty over the period of our sample. 
There are 51 AD cases filed against Brazil in this period, 40 of which resulted 
affirmatively. Moreover, these affirmative cases correspond to 120 unique six-
digit HS products. Finally, countries which imposed AD duty on Brazilian 
                                                            
20 See Prusa (2001). 
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exported products accounts for almost 50% of the Brazil’s total exports 
in1997. This allows us to expect a dramatic impact of AD duties imposed by 
these countries on the trade flows of Brazilian firms to third countries. Table 
2.1 documents the products subject to AD duties and the duty imposing 
countries between 1994 and 2000.  
Our main findings in this study can be summarized as follows. 
Imposition of an AD duty on Brazilian HS six-digit products leads to a 25-
33% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to alternative 
countries where the firms previously exported the same product. Besides, it 
results in a 9% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to the 
countries where the firms exported another product. On the contrary, there is 
no significant effect of AD duties on the exports of the particular product to 
alternative countries the firm did not serve before. Further, exploring the 
extensive margin of trade deflection, we demonstrate that imposition of an 
AD duty against Brazilian exported products increases the probability of the 
targeted firms to introduce the particular product to a new market they 
previously served. When targeted by an AD duty in an export market, a 
firm’s probability to start exporting the “duty imposed product” in an 
alternative destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported to 
that destination. However, we find no such evidence for the countries to 
which the firm did not export before.  
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These findings shed light on the role of the past trading relationships 
on trade deflection and strongly support the sunk start-up costs argument on 
the heterogeneity of trade deflection to different countries. In line with the 
earlier studies on the entry to international markets with sunk costs21, the 
results obtained employing the export data of Brazilian firms suggests that 
firms are more willing to deflect their shipments to their ongoing trading 
partners instead of starting to export to a different destination in order to 
avoid paying the market specific start-up costs such as learning the 
bureaucratic procedures of exporting to a country.22 In addition, for the 
countries that the firm served before, the magnitude of trade deflection is 
found to be higher to the ones the firm exported the same product compared 
to the ones the firm exported another product. This heterogeneity in the 
results for the firms, which have different types of product-level trading 
relationships in an export destination, can be attributed to the product-
market specific start-up costs such as adapting the product in a particular 
destination.  
To date, empirical evidence using firm-level data on AD policy is 
scarce. Konings and Vandenbussche (henceforth KV) (2008) estimate the 
effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-
                                                            
21 See Melitz (2003) and Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
 
22 One example in this category is the “Importer Security Filing” rule which recently went 
into effect in the US.  
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competing firms in the EU. Belderbos (1997) illustrates the relationship 
between EU and US antidumping measures and foreign direct investment 
through a micro-econometrical analysis of Japanese firms’ plant 
establishments in the electronics industry. In a noticeably detailed analysis, 
Pierce (2009) investigates the plant-level responses to AD measures for the 
protected plants in the US. KV (2009) remains the only firm-level study of 
AD policy to analyze the value of export sales and the extensive margin of 
exports. Although related, our paper conceptually distinguishes from KV 
(2009) for two reasons. First, their study focuses on the effect of France’s own 
imposed AD duties on the exports of the protected firms, whereas we analyze 
the effect of AD duties which targets the exporters in the international 
market. Second, they exploit a two dimensional panel which does not 
differentiate the product categories for the firms which exports multiple 
products. Whereas, with a unique three dimensional panel data for firm, 
product and destinations, the empirical analysis carried out in this paper is a 
significant improvement over the previous studies. For the same reason, it is 
the first attempt to use such a detailed, highly disaggregated data to analyze 
the trading effects of AD protection.23  
Extensive margin exploration, on the other hand, most closely related 
with Alvarez et al. (2009) in terms of the effect of previous exporting on the 
                                                            
23 Examples of papers (among others) using firm-level export data with the information on 
export destinations are: Eaton et al. (2005) and Buono (2009) for France, Manova (2009) for 
China, Alvarez et al. (2009) for Chile. 
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probability of exporting a new product. Employing Chilean firm-level data 
which has the same features with ours (in terms of the details about 
exporting activities), their study documents that a firm’s previous export 
experience increases the probability that the firm will export a previously 
exported product to a different market or a different product to a market 
where this firm already exported a product. Both Alvarez et al. and our study 
clearly points out that previous trading relationships which are important 
determinants of new exporting activities. With respect to trade policy 
implementations of extensive margin, our analysis also complements the set 
of papers (including, but not limited to Debeare and Mostashari 2010, Buono 
2009, Buona and Lalanne 2010, KV 2009) examining the effect of 
protectionism (or liberalization) on the probability of observing new product 
varieties or new firms in export markets. For the first time in the literature, 
our investigation focuses on the question whether a country’s imposition of an 
import restriction affects targeted firms’ probability of exporting the 
particular product to alternative countries, rather than the duty imposer 
country itself.  This provides additional implications to analyze the effect of 
trade policy on the variety of goods countries trade and on the number of 
exporting firms in different countries.  
Our findings also provide additional insights to analyze the effect of 
trade deflection on the proliferation on AD actions around the world. For 
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instance, Feinberg and Reynolds (2006, 2007) and Moore and Zanardi (2008) 
speculate that the spread of AD filings may partially be explained by trade 
deflection.24 As noted earlier, when exports are deflected to third countries, 
these third countries might also subsequently request more import protection 
in the form of AD duties. To capture this possible explanation, they use a 
variable which is equal to the number of global AD cases filed the previous 
year in the particular industry category. Although their estimates are 
significant, this variable does not capture the true effect of trade deflection 
due to the aggregation. It is not typical for a country to impose a restriction 
on a product because of a surge in imports in another product within the 
same industry. Second, this measure does not provide any clue about the 
destinations that exports should deflect to. For instance, a high number of 
AD duties imposed on steel products in North America against Mexico does 
not guarantee either trade deflection for all Mexican firms or trade deflection 
to all countries. As a matter of fact, it is less likely to observe a reaction from 
a country, which has a small import share of steel from North America, to a 
steel war in the region. Our study also raises additional concern to the WTO’s 
China safeguard which allows members to deviate from MFN rule based on 
the threat of trade deflection. As more disaggregated firm-level data of 
exports become available, we believe that researchers should seriously focus 
on the trading relationships of firms in different countries when they 
                                                            
24 We should note that the effect of trade deflection on the spread of AD filings is not the 
actual research question, whereas, it is a control variable in both papers. 
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evaluate the threat of trade deflection and its effect on the rise of 
protectionist policies.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses the motivation of our empirical strategy, some preview discussion, 
the formal econometric methodology and alternative estimations we 
performed. In section 3 we describe the data, Section 4 documents the results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
The Empirical Investigation  
The classification of firm-product combinations 
Participating in export markets requires sunk start-up costs of 
establishing necessary networks, acquiring information about the official 
procedures and adapting products. This makes the current- period export 
supply dependent upon the previous exporting status, given the fact that 
firms are able to continue exporting without burdening the start-up costs if 
they already exported to a particular market before.25 Das et al. (2001), for 
instance, provide an estimation of such costs using structural estimates for 
Colombian firms and suggest that these costs are quite substantial; on 
average as high as 400,000 dollars. Most models of international trade on 
firm heterogeneity assume that these entry costs to export market are 
                                                            
25 See Dixit (1989) and, Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2001).  
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constant and exogenous to the firm.26 More recently, utilizing Chilean firm-
level data Alvarez et al. (2009) uncovers sizeable heterogeneity across 
destinations in the nature of entry into different markets for firm-product 
combinations. Their study points out that these costs are indeed, market and 
product-market specific.  
  We also build our empirical strategy on these start-up costs of 
exporting. To do so, we classify the firms whose product is targeted by an AD 
duty on the basis of their previous trading relationships to alternative 
countries. Figure 1 demonstrates this classification in a three country setting. 
When country A imposes an AD duty on Brazilian exporters of good X, there 
are three types of firms at the time of duty imposition which are affected by 
this AD measure:  
• Type 1 firm, which was exporting good X to country A and 
non-exporter in country B.  
• Type 2 firm, which was exporting good X to both A and B.  
• Type 3 firm, which was an exporter of good X in country A 
but exporter of another product in country B.  
In order to deflect its trade to country B, type 1 firm, which did not 
export to country B before, has to incur the market and product-market 
specific start-up cost. However, type 3 firm does not have to incur the market 
specific start-up cost in a similar scenario, given the fact that it has already 
                                                            
26 For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and Melitz (2003). 
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served country B before. When it comes to the type 2 firm, which has an 
ongoing trading relationship for good X in both countries, there is no need to 
burden any start-up cost. Intuitively, deflecting trade to its trading partner 
for the type 2 firm is as easy as a couple of more phone calls compared to the 
type 1 firm which faces a burden of entering to a new country, contacting 
potential customers and establishing necessary distribution channels to sell 
its product. On the other hand, type 3 firm has a comparative advantage over 
type 1 firm in terms of market specific start-up costs such as learning the 
bureaucratic procedures to export to country B. 
In the light of this three country setting, we classify the firm-product 
combinations for the observations where good X is hit with an AD measure in 
another country. To do so, we first create a dummy variable which takes on a 
value of 1 if a firm-product combination is targeted by an AD duty in a 
country besides the country of the unit observation. Following BC (2007), this 
variable is not zero in the period in which the investigation for an affirmative 
AD case is begun because of the fact that the targeted exporters begin to 
respond to tentative duty imposition shortly after the date filing is 
announced. Second, in order to identify the effect of previous trading 
relationships of the firms, we use three different dummies for the three types 
of past export status described above.27 More specifically, each AD duty 
imposed in an export market creates the three country case mentioned above 
                                                            
27 We use three year definition to describe the firm’s past export status.  
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for Brazil, the duty imposer country and the destination country of the unit 
observation. Consequently, a firm-product combination might be classified as 
different types in different observations at a year depending on the 
destination. 28 The effect of AD duty on type 2 firm-product group represents 
the intensive margin of trade deflection while, type 1 and type 3 represents 
the extensive margin. Further, we also undertake an alternative estimation 
for extensive margin and analyze whether the imposition of an AD duty in a 
country leads the targeted type 1 and type 3 firms to introduce their 
particular products in new markets.  
In addition to the three types of firm-product combinations described 
above, there is also another type which is indirectly affected by the duty 
imposed in country A: those which were exporters of good X in B, non-
exporters in A. Although the duty imposed in country A does not directly 
affect them, part of the deflection in good X from country B to A can be 
explained by the depressed trade of the exporters in this category. Therefore, 
we also add these firm-product combinations to our classification as type 4.  
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of our sample. When an AD 
duty imposed on a product, we have 41% of the firm-product combinations as 
type 2, 27% as type 1 and 19% as type 3. Our goal is to document the 
heterogeneity of trade deflection for these different types of previous trading 
relationships across destinations to analyze the potential export markets for 
                                                            
28 We would also write “depending on the duty imposer”. However, as shown in Table 1, there 
is no single year in which more than one country imposed AD duty to the same product.  
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the firms to deflect trade when their products suffer an AD duty in the 
international market.  
Before proceeding, a preview of this heterogeneity is shown in Figure 
2.2. The vertical axis of the graph shows the mean value of the growth of 
exports for firm-product combinations in the sample and the solid horizontal 
line shows the sample average. In the horizontal axis, we denote our 
classifications when there is an AD duty imposed in an export market other 
than the particular destination. The increase in growth of exports due to an 
AD duty faced in an export market except the particular destination 
demonstrates the trade deflection. As shown in the figure, contrary to the 
slight difference for type 1, the average of export growth is much higher for 
type 2 and type 3 firm-product combinations when their product is hit with 
an AD duty. This suggests that firms tend to deflect a higher volume of trade 
to the countries where they already exported when their products suffer an 
AD duty in an export market. On the other hand, a higher average of export 
growth for type 2 firm-product combinations speaks to the influence of 
exporting the same product before on deflected trade. In our empirical section 
we evaluate the indicative heterogeneity shown in figure 2 and assess which 
type of trading relationship provides significant trade deflection when other 
factors are also taken into account.     
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Empirical Specification 
Trade Deflection (Export Values)  
Consider first the variation in exports for a firm-product category 
across export destinations. The effect of an AD duty imposed by a country on 
the exports of the Brazilian firms to other countries can be interpreted as 
trade deflection. In order to quantify that effect, we start with the following 
reduced form equation: 
݈݊൫ݔ௙௣௜௧൯ ൌ ߚଵ ݈݊൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଵ൯ + ߚଶሺܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁1) + ߚଷ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁2൯	+
ߚସ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯ + +ߚହ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁4൯ + ߚ଺݈݊൫ ௙ܹ௧൯ + ߚ଻ ݈݊൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯ + ߝ௙௣௜௧     
                                                                                                             (1) 
where f denotes a firm, p denotes a six-digit HS product, i denotes an export 
destination, t denotes time in years. The variable ൫ݔ௙௣௜௧൯ and ൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯   is the 
value of exports, ሺܣܦ௙௣௛௧) is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the particular 
firm-product combination is hit with an AD duty in an export destination 
except country i; ܶݕ݌݁1, ܶݕ݌݁2 and ܶݕ݌݁3 and ܶݕ݌݁4 are dummy variables to 
indicate the past exporting status to country i at firm-product level as 
described above. Type 1 takes on a value of 1 if the firm in the unit 
observation is exporting the targeted product to country h before the duty 
imposition, but non-exporter in country i. Type 2 is equal to 1 if the firm in 
the unit observation is exporting the targeted product to both countries h and 
i before the duty imposition; Type 3 is equal to 1 if the firm in the unit 
observation is exporting the targeted product to country h before the duty 
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imposition, non-exporter of that product but exporter of another product in 
country i. Finally, Type 4 is a binary indicator if the firm in the unit 
observation is non-exporter of the particular product in county h but 
exporting it to country i. β2, β3 and β4 denote the magnitude of trade 
deflection for each previous exporting relationship. Finally, ൫ ௙ܹ௧൯ is a vector 
of firm characteristics.  
We assume that  ߝ௙௣௜௧ comprises two components, a permanent firm-
product-country component and a transitory component. So the error term 
satisfies: 
			ߝ௙௣௜௧ ൌ ݑ௙௣௜௧ + ߤ௙௣௜                                          (2)                      
where ݑ௙௣௜௧~iidሺ0, σ୙ଶ ) and μ௙௣௜~iidሺ0, σஜଶ) are independent of each other.  Fixed 
effects (FE) estimator is one way of estimating equation (1) because it 
eliminates time invariant error component, μ௙௣௜.		However, the greatest 
econometric concern in FE estimation of equation (1) is that it results in 
biased and inconsistent estimates associated with the serial correlation of 
ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଵ൯	and ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯ with FE transformed residuals. In order to remedy 
this autocorrelation, we first difference equation (1) and estimate it using the 
two stage least squares/instrumental variables (IV) approach described in 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which we instrument for ∆ln	ሺݔ௙௣௜௧ିଵ) and 
∆ln	ሺݔ௙௧ିଵ) using the multiple lags of the levels of these variables.29 
                                                            
29 Note that direct estimation of the first difference of equation (1) by OLS also provides 
biased estimates because lagged difference of exports is correlated with the error term. 
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Our IV first difference equation then becomes: 
∆ln(xfpit) = β1 ∆ln(xft-1)+ β2 ∆(ADfpht * Type1) + β3 ∆(ADfpht * Type2) + β4 ∆(ADfpht 
* Type3) + ߚହ∆൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁4൯ + ߚ଺∆݈݊൫ ௙ܹ௧൯ + ߚ଻∆ ݈݊൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯ + ∆ߝ௙௣௜௧       (3)                      
  It should be emphasized that there are two potential problems with the 
IV estimator used in estimating equation (2); bias due to the measurement 
error and bias associated with the use of a weak instrument. If there is 
measurement error in ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧൯ and ln	ሺݔ௙௧ିଵ), then the measurement error in 
the variables, ∆ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଵ൯ and ∆ln	ሺݔ௙௧ିଵ), will be correlated with the 
measurement error in the instruments, ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଶ൯and 	ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଶ൯.Therefore, we 
employ alternative instruments,	ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଷ൯	 and ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଷ൯,	in consideration 
that their measurement error is not correlated with the measurement error 
in ∆ln൫ݔ௙௣௜௧ିଵ൯ and ∆ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯.30 In addition, to test the quality of the 
instruments, we estimate the first-stage model using our instruments. We 
find that our instruments are strong and conclude that IV approach is 
appropriate for our estimation.31 We also document the estimates for both FE 
in levels and IV first difference estimation.32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
30See BC (2007) for the same argument.  
 
31 While we do not report the results of the instrument tests to save space, the first stage 
estimations are available from the author upon request. 
 
32  An alternative strategy to estimate equation (2) would be the Generalized Method of 
Moments estimation described in Arellano and Bond (1991). However, when the country-year 
dummies are included for aggregate variation, this estimation becomes infeasible because of 
the large number of parameters to be estimated.  
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Extensive Margin of Trade Deflection 
We also investigate whether the imposition of an AD duty against 
Brazilian exported products in a particular export market affects the 
probability that targeted firms will start to export their duty imposed 
products to a new export destination. In other words, we analyze whether 
type 1 and type 3 firms, which are non-exporters of the targeted product in 
country i, becomes an exporter for that product as a result of an AD duty 
imposed in country h. We believe that firms whose products suffer AD duty in 
an export destination are more likely to start exporting their products to 
alternative markets where they previously exported given the fact that they 
have a comparative advantage in those markets in terms of country-specific 
start-up costs. To develop an understanding of the heterogeneity to the effect 
of an AD duty on the firm-product combinations of different types of previous 
exporting activities, we start with the following binary choice model: 
ܲ൫ݕ௙௣௜௧ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ߚଵ ݈݊൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯ + ߚଶሺܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁1) 	+ ߚଷ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯ +
ߚସ݈݊൫ ௙ܹ௧൯ + ߴ௙௣௜௧          (2.4) 
 where the binary dependent variable ݕ௙௣௜௧ is equal to 1 if the firm i starts to  
export product p to country i at time t. Once again, of particular interest are 
the AD policy interactions. β2 can be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of observing a new product in country i from the firms, which 
were non-exporters in country i, when an AD duty hits their exported product 
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in country h. In a similar manner, β3 shows the change in the same 
probability for the firms which were exporters of another product in country i.  
The most important issue in estimation (4) is the influence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. There might be some permanent firm or product 
attributes; or managerial skills which are correlated with the decision to 
start exporting a particular product as a result of an AD duty faced in 
another destination. This will yield us to overestimate the effect of our policy 
interactions as these variations are not observed. There are different 
alternatives to estimate the binary choice model of starting to export a 
product with unobserved elements including maximum likelihood techniques 
such as probit or conditional logit, or linear probability model with random or 
fixed effects. For the reason that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with 
our firm specific controls, random effect estimation is not appropriate for our 
specification. As a result, to model the unobserved heterogeneity as fixed, we 
choose to work with linear probability model. In addition, it is highly likely 
that unobserved characteristics in our model are serially correlated with 
ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯. Therefore, we follow a methodology similar to our earlier estimation 
to correct for autocorrelation and instrument for  ln൫ݔ௙௧ିଵ൯ using its second 
lag. We advance in two steps. First, we undertake FE estimation of equation 
(4) in levels. Given the potential correlation of FE transformed residuals with 
the lagged export value, we also estimate our model using IV first differences 
56 
 
in order to avoid the problem of inconsistent estimates found in the fixed 
effects model.            
Control Variables 
Exporters are found to be more productive than non-exporters.33 In line 
with this, a change in exporter firm’s productivity over time might affect the 
total value of its shipments over time. Therefore, our policy interactions 
might capture the effect of a productivity shock at the firm level that would 
be correlated with the growth in exports or the decision to start exporting the 
product to a particular destination. The export data, SECEX, does not allow 
us to control for productivity because it contains no information on domestic 
sales. However, the lagged value of total exports proxies the productivity of 
the firms.34  
On the other hand, we also control for the size of the firm which is 
measured by the total number of workers and the average wage bill paid by 
the firm within a year. It is believed that larger firms tend to be more 
productive and have higher expected profits from exporting. Moreover, as 
discussed in Bernard and Jensen (2004), size may control for several factors; 
larger firms might have lower average and marginal costs which cause an 
increase in the likelihood of exporting, also size is a proxy for past success by 
definition. Further, inclusion of the average wages paid by the exporting 
firms is motivated by the fact that higher wages paid by the firm is 
                                                            
33 See Greenway and Kneller (2007) for a survey of this literature. 
34 Alvarez et al. (2009) 
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associated with higher quality of output which positively affects exporting the 
goods into foreign markets. However, the limitation of using this variable is 
that its availability reduces our sample from roughly 800,000 to 49,000.  
 The growth in exports or the decision to start exporting a product to a 
particular country can also partially be explained by macroeconomic factors 
in the export market. For instance, trade openness, GDP growth and 
exchange rate appreciation in a potential export destination can work as an 
import demand shifter which would induce exporters to deflect their 
shipments to that destination. In this regard, we use country-year dummies 
to control for macroeconomic aggregates.  
     Data 
 Export data comes from the Brazilian customs office SECEX 
(Secretaria de Comércio Exterior ) which gathers export reports by product 
code at the plant, month and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul ) 
level. The NCM codes are 8-digit numbers, of which the first six digits 
coincide with the first six digits in the Harmonized System. The destination 
information is mapped from Brazilian country codes into the international 
ISO system. Product codes at the 6-digit level in the Brazilian data, for which 
there exists no corresponding Harmonized System entries, are removed from 
the data. All export values in the SECEX data are reported in current U.S. 
dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We utilize observations on exporting 
plants, declared export values and export destinations for the years 1994 
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through 2000. We aggregate monthly plant-level export information to years 
and firms. Export sales are deflated to their August-1994 equivalents using 
the monthly U.S. consumer price index (from Global Financial Data).  
The employment and wage data of Brazilian firms are obtained from 
the collection of annual reports with individual information on workers and 
employees, which is called RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais).  
Similar to our treatment of the export data, we aggregate the monthly 
worker-plant information to years and firms.  We use the reported December 
wage, which is recorded in multiples of the “monthly minimum wage” that 
prevails at the time. The reported December wage in RAIS excludes the 
“thirteenth salary,” which is a special December payment made in some 
sectors. Multiplying our reported December wage figures by twelve provides a 
good estimate of an annual wage. We calculate the wage value in Brazilian 
Real (BRL) and deflate all wages to August 1994.35  
Finally, the data on AD is obtained from Global Antidumping 
Database.36 This database provides detailed product level information on the 
AD petitions such as the initiation date, the decision date, the targeted 
country, and the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes of 
the products subject to filings. AD duties are not homogenous for countries 
and products; rather they can take the form of price undertaking, an ad 
                                                            
35 See Molina and Muendler (2009) and Hirakawa et al. (2010) for more information about 
SECEX and RAIS data. 
 
36    http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/ 
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valorem duty or a specific duty in different cases. Consequently, we use a 
dummy variable to identify the effect of AD given the different units in AD 
duties across cases and countries.   
Empirical Results 
 The results from estimating equation (3) are shown in Table 2.3. In the 
first two columns, we do not include the AD policy interactions with previous 
exporting status, whereas we only use the AD duty dummy to compare the 
results with the specifications which include the interactions. As shown, our 
full sample has 548698 observations, however, adding the number of 
employees to regressions reduces the sample to roughly 460,000 and using 
the wage bill further reduces the sample to around 50,000. All specifications 
include country-year dummies to control for aggregate variation at the 
country level over time. In addition, based on the F-tests obtained in the first 
stage, we conclude that all of our instrumental variables are strong and our 
estimates are unbiased.       
 Consider first specifications (1) and (2). Looking at the insignificant 
estimates of the AD duty imposed on a HS six-digit product in specifications 
(1) and (2), we would conclude that AD duties does not cause trade deflection 
in our sample. However, interaction of the AD policy variable with the 
previous exporting status of the firms for the targeted product provides 
interesting outcomes in terms of trade deflection. Specification (3) through (5) 
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documents the estimates for the AD duty interactions. Specification (4) 
controls for the size and specification (5) controls for both the size and the 
average wage bill. The estimates in these specifications provide strong 
evidence for the heterogeneity of the effect of AD duty on deflected trade for 
different types of previous exporting relationships. As shown, when there is 
an AD duty imposed on Brazilian exported products, there is no significant 
trade deflection to the countries where the firm was non-exporter before. 
However, the significant estimates of the coefficients on AD duty interactions 
with type 2 and type 3 suggests that firms whose product suffer an AD duty 
in a particular export destination, deflect their trade to alternative countries 
where they exported before. Although the coefficient on AD duty interaction 
with type 3 turns to be insignificant in specification (5), we do not observe 
whether it is due to the additional control we use or due to the decrease in 
our sample size. On the other hand, the significance of the variable ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ
ܶݕ݌݁2) is insensitive to the choice of control variables.  
 To better quantify the magnitude of trade deflection, we use the 
formula in Kennedy (1981) to convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to 
its true marginal effect. The result developed in his paper papers suggests 
that if the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, α is the estimated 
coefficient on a dummy variable and V(α) is the estimated variance of α then: 
               p = 100 (exp(α - V(α)/2) - 1)             (5) 
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gives us an estimate of the percentage impact of the dummy variable on the 
variable being explained. The estimates in Table 3 demonstrates that 
imposition of a trade restriction in the form of an AD measure on a Brazilian 
HS product results in a % 18 increase in the firms’ exports of the targeted 
product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported that 
product. Trade deflection resulting from an AD duty is also remarkably 
higher to the countries where firms exported the targeted product compared 
to the countries where the firm did export another product. The coefficient 
estimates on ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯  in Table 3 suggests that imposition of an AD 
duty leads to an 8% increase in the firms’ exports of the targeted product to 
the countries where the firms were non-exporter for the duty imposed 
product, but exporter of another product.   
 In conclusion to table 2.3, the insignificant coefficient estimate of 
൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁1൯	points out that start-up costs of exporting plays a crucial 
role in determining the potential export market to deflect trade for the firms 
whose product suffer an AD duty in a particular destination. This is also 
closely related to the temporary feature of the AD duties. It would be 
reasonable for a targeted firm to deflect its trade to a country they never 
exported before as a result of a permanent change in a particular country’s 
trade policy. However, the cost of the temporary adjustment in trade policy in 
the form of an AD duty in an export market does not seem enough to offset 
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the start-up costs in another destination. In addition, the sizable increase in 
the growth of exports of the targeted products to the countries where the 
firms of those products have ongoing trading relationships is a further 
support to the start-up cost argument. Last but not least, the difference in 
coefficient estimates between ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁2൯ and ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯ 
highlight the importance of product-market specific start-up costs in firms' 
decision to deflect trade to third countries when their product is hit with an 
AD duty in a particular destination.  Further, the negative coefficient 
estimate of ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁4൯ also speaks to the trade depressing effect of AD 
duty in the markets rather than the duty imposer. This shows that part of 
the deflection in trade is also due to the trade depression that some exporters 
(those whose products were not hit in country h) experienced in the 
alternative markets. 
 When it comes to control variables, all of them have predicted signs. 
The increase in the total export of firms in the previous year, the size which 
is measured by number of workers and the average wage bill is associated 
with a current export growth for a product category within firm. Since they 
are not of particular interest, we do not discuss them here in detail.37  
 In what follows, we also report the FE results in levels in Table 2.4 to 
provide a comparison on the IV first difference estimates we obtained,. 
                                                            
37 We do the same for the remaining tables. 
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Neither the sign nor the significance of the variables is changed. ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ
ܶݕ݌݁1) remains to be insignificant in all specifications.	On the contrary, both 
൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁2൯and ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯ are significant despite their lower 
magnitude compared to the IV first difference estimation. This might indicate 
that controlling for firm-product-destination fixed effects absorbed much of 
the deflecting effect of the AD duties. FE estimation also reduced the 
coefficient estimates for the lagged export values and other firm 
characteristics.  
 Our final robustness check aims to address the concern that the 
deflecting effect of an AD duty might be particularly resulting from steel 
cases; given the fact that steel industry is the most frequently targeted 
industry as shown in Table 2.1. For that purpose, we add interactions of the 
AD policy variable with an indicator for whether the particular product is a 
steel or non-steel product.38 As documented in Table 2.5, including steel and 
non-steel interaction terms does not alter our results. Similarly, we find no 
evidence of trade deflection to the countries where firms did not export before 
both for steel and non-steel products. In contrast, there is a significant trade 
deflection to the countries where the firms had previous trading relationships 
for both product categories.  
                                                            
38 Steel products are HS chapter 72 or 73.  
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With respect to the magnitude of trade deflection, coefficient estimates 
in Table 2.5 shows that trade deflection to the countries where the firms have 
type 2 trading relationship is higher for steel products compared to non-steel 
ones. Imposition of an AD duty against Brazilian exported products yields a 
19% increase in firms’ exports of targeted steel product to the countries 
where the firms exported the particular product before. For non-steel 
products, the increase in exports to the same set of countries is 16%. Further, 
when targeted by an AD duty in the export market, the increase in firms’ 
exports to alternative markets where the firms served with another product 
is 5% for steel products and 10% for non-steel products. This higher effect of 
the interaction of non-steel dummy suggests that steel producers faced higher 
product specific start-up costs in export markets. This can also be attributed 
to the fact that steel exporters, which suffer an AD duty in a particular 
country, recognize the potential AD investigation they might face in another 
country   given the fact that steel products accounts for the highest share in 
the total worldwide AD filings. Non-steel exporters, on the other hand, have 
less risk in terms of the same concern.    
Having analyzed the trade deflection using export values, we report 
the results for the extensive margin of trade deflection in Tables 2.6 through 
2.8. In these specifications the binary dependent variable takes on a value of 
1 if the firm starts to export a particular product to a new export destination. 
65 
 
The policy variable and its interactions assist us to identify whether the firms 
start to export a particular duty imposed product to an alternative 
destination. Table 2.6 documents the results of the linear probability model 
using IV first difference estimation. Once again, specifications (1) and (2) 
include the number of employees and the last specification includes the 
average bill. F-test statistics obtained in the first stage implies that all of our 
instrumental variables are strong and our estimates are unbiased. Similar to 
the earlier results on trade deflection using export values, using the AD 
policy variable without interactions yields insignificant estimates as shown in 
specifications (1) and (2). In contrast, estimates in the specifications (3) 
through (5) provides a diversity for the effect of the imposed AD duties on the 
probability of starting to export the targeted product to a new country when 
the policy variable is interacted with type 1 and type 3 previous trading 
relationships.  
First, insignificant estimates of AD policy interaction with type 1 
indicates that AD duties imposed on a particular exported product does not 
affect the probability that firms start to export the targeted product to a new 
market where they were non-exporter of that product in the past. On the 
other hand, the coefficient estimates for ൫ܣܦ௙௣௛௧ ൈ ܶݕ݌݁3൯ suggest that the 
probability of observing a new firm-product combination in an export 
destination, where the firm already served with another product, is increased 
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by 8-10% if an AD duty is imposed on the particular product in a different 
export destination.  
To summarize, the effect of an AD duty imposed on a product by a 
country on the extensive margin of export flows to the third countries only 
appears in the form of existing exporters exporting the particular duty 
imposed product to the countries where they were serving via another 
product before. In contrast, we do not observe any effect on the probability 
that non-exporter of any product in a country starts to export a product which 
is hit with an AD duty in another country. This emphatically points out that 
suffering temporary AD duties in an export destination is not sufficient to 
trigger the firm to bear a whole burden of “market” and “product specific” 
start-up cost of exporting the targeted product to a different destination. 
However, it causes the targeted firms to burden a product-specific start-up 
cost for their targeted products in an export market they already served. 
Overall, Table 2.6 demonstrates that the role of past exporting status is 
clearly evident for the extensive margin of trade deflection to third countries 
resulting from an AD duty.   
Table 2.7 shows the results of the FE estimates for the extensive 
margin of trade deflection. Similar to the earlier findings, the only difference 
of the FE estimation is that it generated slightly lower coefficients for the 
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independent variables. However, neither the sign nor the significance of the 
coefficients changed. 
One might be concerned that the estimates for the extensive margin of 
trade deflection are driven particularly by steel products. For this 
consideration, we include the steel and non-steel interactions in order to 
separate out the effect of AD duty. The results of this specification are 
reported in Table 2.8. As shown, while the interaction of the AD duty with 
the type 1 trading relationship is insignificant for both steel and non-steel 
products, the type 3 interaction is significant for both.  Interestingly, the size 
of the increase in the probability to start exporting to the countries where the 
firms were exporters of another product is much higher for non-steel 
products. When hit with an AD duty, the probability that the firm will start 
exporting the targeted product to a destination they have already served 
increases by 4-7% for non-steel products; whereas, it increases by 1.5% - 1.8% 
for steel products.  This is also parallel to our earlier estimates of trade 
deflection using export values. Steel exporters seem to face a higher product 
specific start-up costs as a result of the political sensitivity of the steel 
industry in terms of import protection. 
            Conclusion 
   Trade deflection has become an important issue in the WTO and other 
Customs Unions’ framework. From China specific safeguards to intra-
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regional trade protocols, there are many examples of policy debates regarding 
this issue. This paper represents the first attempt to utilize a rich three 
dimensional customs data of firms, products and export destinations to 
analyze the effect of past exporting relationships on trade deflection resulting 
from AD duties which targets Brazilian exported products during the 1994-
2000 period. We document substantial heterogeneity of trade deflection to the 
countries depending on targeted firms’ previous trading relationships. First, 
using the export values, we show that imposition of an AD duty on Brazilian 
products leads to an 18% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular 
product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported that 
product and an 8% increase in the firms’ exports of the particular product to 
the countries where the firms exported another product. To the contrary, we 
find no significant effect of AD duties on the exports of the firms’ particular 
product to alternative countries the firm did not export before. This clearly 
demonstrates that firms are more willing to deflect trade to their ongoing 
trading partners instead of starting to export to a different destination in 
order to avoid paying the market specific start-up costs. In addition, the 
higher magnitude of deflected trade to the countries the firm exported the 
same product compared to the countries the firm exported another product, 
points out the role of product-market specific start-up costs of exporting for 
the decision to deflect shipments to alternative destinations. Further, 
exploring the extensive margin of trade deflection, we demonstrate that 
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imposition of an AD duty against Brazil increases the probability that 
Brazilian firms will introduce the particular product to a new market they 
previously served. When targeted by an AD duty in an export market, a 
firm’s probability to start exporting the duty imposed product in a different 
destination increases by 8-10% if the firm already exported to that 
destination. However, our estimates show no such evidence for the countries 
to which the firm did not export before. We also show that estimated trade 
deflection varies for steel and non-steel products, which is the result of the 
political sensitivity of the steel products in terms of AD investigations.  
Our paper also paves the way for a more detailed exploration of trade 
deflection using the firm level data in order to better understand the trading 
effects of AD policy not only for the duty imposer and the targeted country 
but also for the third countries which are not named in the investigation. In 
addition, we also point out a new perspective to examine the relationship 
between trade deflection and the spread of worldwide AD filings. We believe 
that researchers and policy makers should focus more on exporting firms’ 
past trading relationships when evaluating the threat of trade deflection to 
the rules and bindings of World trading system. 
Another related question regarding our paper is that whether the 
targeted firms switch exported products in the duty imposer country when 
they deflect their trade to different destinations or whether the imposition of 
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an AD duty in a country affects the firms’ exports of another product, rather 
than the targeted one, because of trade deflection. While our focus in this 
paper is the effect of past trading relationships on trade deflection, analyzing 
the trading effects of AD in terms of these related topics is an attractive 
avenue for future research.  
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Table 2.1. Antidumping duties imposed on Brazil 
Case Imposing country Product Year 
1 USA Stainless Steel Wire Rod 1994 
2 USA Ferrosilicon 1994 
3 USA Silicomanganese 1994 
4 USA Stainless Steel Bar 1994 
5 Australia A4 Cut Ream Copy Paper 1994 
6 Australia Fibreglass Gun Rovings 1994 
7 Canada Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet 1994 
8 European Union Pig Iron (Hematite) 1994 
9 India Bisphenol-A 1994 
10 Mexico Specialty Steel Products 1994 
11 European Union Ferro-Silico Manganese 1995 
12 Mexico Hot-Rolled Steel 1995 
13 Mexico Steel Sheets 1995 
14 Mexico Cold-Rolled Steel 1995 
15 Mexico Steel Plates In Rolls 1995 
16 Mexico Corrugated Iron Sheets 1995 
17 Mexico Butyl Rubber 1995 
18 USA Pressure Pipe 1995 
19 Mexico Steel Connectors 1996 
20 Peru Calcium Carbide 1997 
21 Argentina Chain Saws 1997 
22 Argentina Ceramic Magnets 1997 
23 Argentina Fuses 1997 
24 South Africa Suspension PVC 1997 
25 Argentina Gas Carafe 1998 
26 Argentina Fiber Optic Cables 1998 
27 European Union Monosodium Glutamate 1998 
28 South Africa Uncoated wood-free paper 1998 
29 Argentina Chains 1999 
30 Argentina Abrasives 1999 
31 Argentina Flat Laminated Products 1999 
32 South Africa Cut paper (A4) 1999 
33 Argentina Eviscerated Chicken 2000 
34 Argentina Javelins 2000 
35 Argentina Denim 2000 
36 Argentina Steel Sheets 2000 
37 Canada Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate 2000 
38 Canada Stainless Steel Round Bar 2000 
39 European Union Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings 2000 
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Figure 2.1: Exporting status of the firms before the duty imposition 
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Type 2 Firm  
Type 1 Firm 
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  B 
Trade flows for the products. 
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Figure 2.2: Mean value of the growth of ln(exp)fpi 
 
 
Source: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS Notes: Mean value 
of the growth of ln(exp)fpi is in the horizontal axis. Subscript f is a firm, p is a 
6-digit HS product, i is an export market.  
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Table 2.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation         N 
Dependent variables 
∆ln(expfpit) 3.466 1.399 548698 
New Product 0.370 0.042 548698 
Explanatory variables    
ADdutyt * type1 0.197 0.301 548698 
ADdutyt * type2 0.080 0.167 548698 
ADdutyt * type3 0.053 0.082 548698 
ADdutyt * type4 0.037 0.066 548698 
∆ln(expft) 0.025 0.543 548698 
∆ln(employment)ft 3.467 4.284 548698 
∆(wagebill)ft* -0.0576 0.514 461638
Source: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS.  
Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export 
market,t is a year. * millions of BRL. 
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Notes: Tables 2.3 – 2.8: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market, 
t is a year. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ). ***, **, * show the level of 
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant term 
which is suppressed. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. IV First Difference Estimation 
       Dependent variable: ∆ln(expfpit) 
 
     1    2    3    4    5 
   
AD duty -1.119 -1.087    
 (0.35) (0.57)    
AD duty*type1    -1.509 -1.484 -1.023 
   (0.87) (0.67) (0.45) 
AD duty*type2   0.172 0.171 0.134 
   (20.35)*** (18.70)*** (4.80)*** 
AD duty*type3   0.072 0.075 0.115 
   (2.99)** (2.87)** (0.56) 
AD duty*type4   -0.119 -0.091 -0.115 
   (2.89)** (2.85)** (2.65)** 
ln(expfpit-1) 0.203 0.288 0.203 0.283 0.187 
 (36.52)*** (36.54)*** (37.45)*** (36.33)*** (23.36)*** 
ln(expft-1) 0.075 0.074 0.089 0.084 0.069 
 (12.25)*** (10.23)*** (24.54)*** (26.65)*** (13.65)*** 
ln(empft)  0.125  0.110 0.213 
  (17.95)***  (13.98)*** (6.59)*** 
 Avg.wage     0.000 
     (1.99)** 
Country – year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 548698 461638 548698 491638 49176 
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                      Table 2.4. Fixed Effects Estimation (Levels) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
AD duty -0.041 -0.032    
 (0.36) (0.29)    
AD duty*type1    -0.104 -0.184 -0.107 
   (0.89) (0.72) (0.65) 
AD duty*type2   0.127 0.127 0.129 
   (16.71)*** (16.15)*** (4.11)**
AD duty*type3   0.037 0.026 0.024 
   (7.32)*** (6.72)*** (0.92) 
AD duty*type4   -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.29) (0.76) (0.73) 
ln(expfpit-1) 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.045 0.032 
 (87.62)*** (86.54)*** (86.16)*** (85.03)*** (67.34)*
ln(expft-1) 0.026 0.024 0.032 0.042 0.019 
 (18.44)*** (17.69)*** (10.65)*** (9.65)*** (7.86)**
ln(empft)  0.092  0.084 0.146 
  (5.49)***  (8.45)*** (7.65)**
Avg.wage     0.000 
     (4.37)**
Country – year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 548698 461638 548698 491638 49176 
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 1 2 3 
AD duty*type1*non-steel  -1.551 -1.691 -1.443 
 (0.65) (0.76) (0.52) 
AD duty*type2* non-steel 0.159 0.145 0.127 
 (21.55)*** (20.84)*** (4.18)*** 
AD duty*type3* non-steel 0.091 0.087 0.083 
 (16.22)*** (11.76)*** (0.75) 
AD duty*type4* non-steel -0.093 -0.091 -0.087 
 (1.97)* (1.98)* (0.65) 
AD duty*type1*steel  -2.091 -2.010 -1.879 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.25) 
AD duty*type2* steel 0.185 0.188 0.167 
 (18.85)*** (18.21)*** (2.17)** 
AD duty*type3* steel 0.049 0.046 0.043 
 (16.22)*** (2.44)** (0.55) 
AD duty*type4*non-steel -0.112 -0.124 -0.093 
 (2.01)** (1.99)* (0.47) 
ln(expfpit-1) 0.220 0.209 0.226 
 (27.70)*** (26.00)*** (4.47)*** 
ln(expft-1) 0.085 0.080 0.096 
 (21.05)*** (20.17)*** (3.26)*** 
ln(empft)  0.127 0.231 
  (25.79)*** (7.59)*** 
 Avg.wage   0.001 
   (4.66)*** 
Country – year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 548698 461638 49176 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.19 
Table 2.5. IV First Difference Estimation 
              (Steel vs. Non-steel Products) 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(expfpit) 
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Table 2.6.  IV First Differences Estimation of Extensive Margin 
 
 
Note: Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p 
to country c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
AD duty 0.001 0.001    
 (0.34) (0.32)    
AD duty*type1    -0.031 -0.009 -0.006 
   (0.57) (0.76) (0.98) 
AD duty*type3   0.105 0.082 0.098 
   (2.23)** (2.17)** (1.98)** 
ln(expft-1) 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.026 
 (3.16)*** (3.27)*** (6.15)*** (7.27)*** (2.88)*** 
ln(empft)  0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (2.20)**  (2.01)** (2.22)** 
Avg.wage     0.001 
     (12.79)***
Country – year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893405 548698 893405 548698 49176 
R2 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.30 
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Table 2.7.  Fixed Effects Estimation of Extensive Margin 
Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p to 
country c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
AD duty 0.001 0.001    
 (0.34) (0.59)    
AD duty*type1    -0.078 -0.068 -0.043 
   (0.22) (0.39) (0.54) 
AD duty*type3   0.081 0.068 0.074 
   (199.50)**
*
(204.63)**
*
(14.44)***
ln(expft-1) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.022 
 (278.07)*** (281.40)*** (288.07)**
*
(234.29)**
*
(617.38)*
**ln(empft)  0.000  0.000 0.001 
  (2.05)**  (0.88) (3.17)*** 
Avg.wage     0.000 
     (14.77)***
Country – year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893405 548698 893405 548698 49176 
R2 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.35 
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Table 2.8.  IV First Differences Estimation of Extensive Margin 
 
Binary dependent variable = 1 if firm f starts to export a new product p to 
country c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 
AD duty*type1*nonsteel -1.005 -1.005 -0.907 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.26) 
AD duty*type3*nonsteel 0.071 0.068 0.027 
 (230.45)*** (238.34)*** (15.82)*** 
AD duty*type1*steel -0.070 -0.089 -0.065 
 (0.49) (0.36) (0.47) 
AD duty*type3*steel 0.018 0.015 0.016 
 (8.28)*** (8.99)*** (1.96)** 
ln(expft-1) 0.068 0.067 0.077 
 (682.60)*** (651.87)*** (262.50)*** 
ln(empft)  0.003 0.012 
  (8.74)*** (5.63)*** 
Avg.wage   0.001 
   (5.63)*** 
Country – year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 893405 548698 49176 
R2 0.29 0.28 0.30 
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CHAPTER 3 
RETALIATION THREATS AND THE QUALITY OF EXPORTS 
Introduction 
The last two decades witnessed rising administrative protection via 
antidumping (AD) measures. When countries negotiate lower tariffs in trade 
agreements, domestic industries that desire protection against imports can 
still use several methods to gain temporary protection. The most popular of 
these methods is to claim that the trade partner is dumping, or selling below 
the “fair value”. This claim is often made and often generates temporary 
protection, even if it is not true [Konings and Vandenbusche (2008) and 
Aggarwal (2007)]. Antidumping is a very effective loophole that has been 
exploited by developed as well as developing countries.39 According to the 
records of Global Antidumping Database, roughly 4,500 AD petitions have 
been filed in the last 20 years by more than 40 countries.  
Much of the existing studies propose a number of political and 
strategic considerations to explain the proliferation of AD, albeit an ideal 
case aims to hinder unfair competition in the international market. One of 
these proposed explanations is that countries tend to retaliate against the 
countries which previously named them in their AD investigations.  [Miranda 
et al. (1998), Prusa and Skeath (2002), Francois and Niels (2004), Feinberg 
                                                            
39 See Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for an extensive survey.  
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and Reynolds (2006)] These studies suggest that this tit-for-tat strategy for 
AD actions has created an “AD club” which consists of countries which have 
implemented AD law and actively utilizing it. Blonigen and Bown (2003), on 
the other hand, provide another perspective to this debate. They propose that 
the worldwide spread of AD in fact may dampen AD activity given the fact 
that countries become able to retaliate when they start enforcing this law. 
Concentrating on the US AD activity, they show that the risk of a potential 
reaction from the target country decreases the probability of observing AD 
petition from the US industries as well as the likelihood of an affirmative AD 
outcome from the US AD agency. Although whether the retaliation enables or 
dampens the spread of worldwide AD activity is widely examined, nothing is 
known about the exporter firms’ response to a threat of AD retaliation. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to address this issue.   
This paper empirically analyzes the effect of potential AD measures 
(from retaliation) on the quality of products that are exported to the markets 
which may file AD. Our idea is that when products are vertically 
differentiated and price of the goods represents the level of quality, exporting 
firms will increase the quality of their exports to the countries whose 
importers are subject to an AD investigation because of the risk of being 
retaliated for that AD investigation. Using rich three dimensional customs 
data of Brazilian firms which allows us to see the quality heterogeneity 
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across export destinations within the same firm-product groups; we find that 
potential AD reaction from a particular export destination significantly 
increases the quality of exported products to the same destination.  
Several studies stressed that a major concern regarding the AD 
investigations is that they do not take into consideration the quality 
differentials when evaluating the price discrimination in “like products”. For 
instance, Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) and Vandenbussche and 
Wauthy (2001) note the objections on AD duty impositions of European 
Commission from the exporters whose products were in low quality standards 
and have poor brand image compared to their European competitors. These 
studies point out that dumping reflects a “cost advantage” instead of “unfair 
trade”. However, since no quality adjustments are made, exporters of the low-
quality goods, which charge lower price in order to sell their products, are 
experiencing more risk of being targeted by an AD claim.40 In line with this 
argument, when an AD petition is filed by domestic industries and the 
exporters’ flexibility to discriminate prices between the home and the target 
country is restrained because of the threat of retaliation, an expected 
response from the exporting firms is to increase the quality of their 
shipments, which is sold for higher prices, in order to avoid that threat. This 
hypothesis is strongly supported in our empirical analysis by matching the 
                                                            
40 See also Nielsen and Rutkowski (2005) and Hansen and Nielsen (2009) for a similar argument. 
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detailed product-level information on AD cases with highly disaggregated 
export data over the years 1997-2000.   
The main findings in this paper can be summarized as follows. 
Potential AD claims, resulting from an AD investigation in Brazil, increases 
the quality of firms’ exports within the named industry to the target 
countries by 11%. Second, we also addressed the concern that a potential AD 
filing in an export destination is more important for the firms for which the 
named industries’ products in the target country constitute a significant 
share of their total exports. Our estimates based on this interaction also show 
that one standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the 
firms’ products which are exposed to retaliation is associated with a 6% 
increase in the quality of the exported products to the same country. Third, 
we show that this effect is 4% higher for the exporters serving the developed 
countries. This can be attributed to the fact that due to the negligence of 
quality differences in AD investigations, firms exporting to the developed 
countries are more responsive to the retaliation risk because of the higher 
quality production and higher prices charged for the like products in these 
countries. Last but not least, we also show that the increase in the quality of 
exported varieties as a result of retaliation threats is 3% higher to the heavy 
AD user countries. This last finding shows that exporters consider the high 
potential of retaliation in those countries associated with their past AD 
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activity and increase the quality of their exports in their markets more than 
they do in the ones with average AD activity.    
Our paper most closely complements the recent work of Konings and 
Vandenbussche (2009) which examines the effect of France’s own imposed AD 
duties on the export sales of the protected firms. Employing firm-level 
customs data of French exporters, they show that foreign sales of the 
exporters decrease dramatically for the protected firms. In presenting the 
arguments on the decrease in the exports of the protected firms, they also 
point out that this might be the consequence of the limitations of price setting 
in the international market stemming from the AD protection in the home 
market. Similar to theirs, our analysis also focuses on the effect of own AD 
activity on the exports market than the domestic market. However, there are 
two key points that differs our work. First, they use a difference in difference 
approach to see the effect of AD on the exports of the protected firms 
compared to a control group of unprotected ones. In contrast, our focus is not 
the effect of the AD protection in the home market, but the threat of 
retaliation because of the ongoing AD investigation, regardless of its 
tentative outcome. Prusa (2001) shows that exporters react to a tentative AD 
duty imposition right after the AD investigation is filed and AD filings reduce 
the imports of the named countries even if they are not affirmative. From this 
point of view, investigations themselves trigger the retaliatory incentives of 
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the target country.41 Second, our analysis is based on the trading effects of 
the own AD activity in a particular export destination, namely the target 
country of the investigation at home, rather than the entire international 
market. In this regard, the three dimensional information on firms, products 
and export destinations in our data perfectly fits into our research question. 
Although conceptually different, this study is also related to the group 
of papers which analyze the effect of trade policy on the quality of imported 
varieties. One of the more well-known works on quality upgrading is from 
Feenstra (1988) who presented evidence that US imposed import quota 
restraints resulted in substantial upgrading in Japanese car imports. His 
findings suggest that Japanese firms substituted toward high quality given 
the restriction on their quantity of shipments. Das and Donnenfeld (1987), 
Krishna (1987), Herguera et al. (2000) and Toshimitsu (2005) also 
theoretically supported the argument that the average quality increases with 
the trade restriction that exporters face. For the first time in the literature, 
our focus is the quality upgrading resulting from a potential trade restriction 
rather than the imposed one. In this respect, AD duties offer a useful starting 
point given the incremental strategic motivations behind their world-wide 
implementations.  
                                                            
41 Studies on retaliation and AD also use the filing behaviors as the dependent variable.  
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It is also worth noting that, besides its rich firm-level export data, 
Brazil is a suitable country for our analysis in terms of its AD activity as 
well.  Having implemented the AD law in 1987, Brazil ranks in the top ten 
out of all World Trade Organization (WTO) members in the category of 
number of AD petitions filed after the WTO’s inception in 1995. Brazil filed 
71 AD cases over the sample of our data. In addition, as documented in Table 
3.1, Brazil targeted its major trading partners which are also very active AD 
users. Brazil also seems to be a member of the “AD club” given the fact that 
almost all of these countries also targeted Brazil over the same time period in 
several cases. Therefore, considering the threat of AD retaliation is an 
important point for the exporters not only because of the dramatic impact of 
AD duties on trade flows but also because of the target countries’ past AD 
activities against Brazil. In table 3.2, we also document the AD petitions of 
Brazil by three-digit ISIC industries. In line with the world-wide AD 
activities, chemicals and iron-steel industries dominate the filings which are 
followed by food, textile and rubber products industries.42  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section 
describes the data, in section three we present the empirical methodology and 
and results, we conclude with section four. 
 
                                                            
42 Although chemicals industry (ISIC 351) represents the 38% of total AD filings, the firm-
product combinations of this industry constitute only 2 % of our sample.    
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Data 
We employ the detailed export data of Brazilian customs office SECEX 
(Secretaria de Comércio Exterior ) which gathers export reports by product 
code at the plant, month and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul ) 
level. The NCM codes are eight-digit numbers, of which the first six digits 
coincide with the first six digits in the Harmonized System. The destination 
information is mapped from Brazilian country codes into the international 
ISO system. The product codes at the six-digit level in the Brazilian data, for 
which there exist no corresponding Harmonized System entries, are removed 
from the data. All export values in the SECEX data are reported in current 
U.S. dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We use observations on exporting 
plants, declared export values, export destinations and export quantities and 
we aggregate monthly plant-level export information to years and firms. We 
only focus on the manufactured products. The main variable of interest in our 
analysis is the unit price of the exported good p, shipped by firm f to 
destination d which is;  
ݑ௙௣ௗ ൌ ா௫௣௢௥௧	௩௔௟௨௘೑೛೏ொ௨௔௡௧௜௧௬೑೛೏                                                 (1) 
Following the common practice in the international trade literature, 
we use this variable to proxy the quality of exported products. Our sample 
covers between years 1997 and 2000 given the fact that export quantities are 
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available only for this time period. Besides, we removed all observations if 
the export value is zero and there is no information on quantity of shipments.  
The employment data of Brazilian firms is obtained from RAIS 
(Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais) which is the collection of annual 
reports with individual information on workers and employees. Similarly, we 
aggregate the monthly worker-plant information to years and firms.   
Finally, the data on AD activity is obtained from Global Antidumping 
Database.43 This database provides detailed case level information on the AD 
initiations and outcomes such as the date of the initiation and the decision, 
the target country, the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS 
codes of the products subject to filings. To match the six-digit HS products 
with their three-digit ISIC codes, we used the concordances in the Trade 
Production and Protection Database of the World Bank. 
Empirical Methodology and Results  
Baseline Specification 
As discussed, we are primarily interested in the variation of Brazilian 
firms’ export unit values within products across the export destinations. To 
quantify the effect of the threat of retaliation on the quality of exports 
shipped, we begin with estimating the following baseline equation: 
  log	ሺݑ௙௣ௗ௧) ൌ ߛ଴ + ߛଵሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ + ߝ௙௣ௗ௧                              (2) 
 
                                                            
43 http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/ 
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where f denotes the firm, p denotes the six-digit HS product, d denotes the 
export destination and k denotes the three-digit ISIC industry. As noted 
earlier, the variable ݑ௙௣ௗ denotes the unit prices of the exported products, 
which proxies the quality of shipments. ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ is a binary indicator 
which takes on a value of “1” if Brazil filed an AD investigation against 
country d within the three-digit ISIC industry category k in the previous year 
(t-1). Since countries which have not implemented AD law have no capacity to 
retaliate, this variable is zero for such countries. In addition, as shown in 
Table 3.1, a number of countries from European Union (EU) were defendant 
in Brazil’s AD investigations the time period of our sample. Since AD is an 
EU-wide policy, we threat EU as a single country in our analysis.44  
Other Considerations     
We include firm-product-destination fixed effects in our specifications 
to control for the firm level unobservables, such as managerial ability; to 
account for the heterogeneity in the units of measurement in quantities, 
which is used to create the quality index; and to control for the time invariant 
country specific factors, such as distance.  
In addition, as stated in Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen 
(2008) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2008), larger and more productive firms 
                                                            
44 Our results are insensitive to treating each EU country as a different market as well as 
removing EU countries from the sample.  
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pay higher wages, employ better inputs which results in higher quality in 
exports. Although we do not have information on domestic sales, we use the 
‘’number of workers” obtained from the linked employment data to proxy the 
size of the firm.45  
A recent literature (including, but not limited to Hallak 2006, Kneller 
and Yu 2008, Harrigan and Deng 2008, Manova and Zhang 2010, Bastos and 
Silva 2010), on the other hand, has documented that the unit value of 
shipments increases with distance, size and the income of the destination 
country. Therefore, part of the variation in unit export values can be 
explained by these country specific covariates. In this regard, we use country-
year dummies to control for all time variant destination market aggregates, 
such as GDP and exchange rate. Further, Manova and Zhang (2010) 
demonstrated a positive relationship between the revenue exporters earn and 
the prices they charge in the export market. For this consideration, we also 
include the total revenue that the firm earns in the export destination.46 
Another concern in estimating (2) is that export revenues and 
quantities might be measured with error. Following the convention, we 
removed the outliers as firm-product-destination combinations with export 
values below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the distribution 
                                                            
45 The linked employment data also reports the wage bill paid by the firm. However, the 
availability of this variable is so limited in our sample, which does not allow us to utilize. 
46 While we do not report here, using total revenue that the firm earns from the same product 
in the destination as an alternative measure does not alter our findings.   
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to dampen the bias associated with the measurement error. The extensive 
fixed effects our specifications also attenuates concerns with measurement 
error to a certain degree.47  
Results  
After removing the observations with individual exporting activities, 
zero values for quantities and export values, we end up with roughly 450,000 
observations. All regression results are derived from a panel-data fixed effect 
estimation in which the panel is a firm-product-destination triplet. All 
specifications include country-year dummies to control for the aggregate 
variation in the export market. Table 3.4 contains the main results from 
estimating equation (2). In column (1), we report our estimates without 
controls. We include our two controls, the revenue measure and the firm size, 
in specifications (2) and (3) respectively. The variable “log(revenue)fdt”  
denotes the total revenue that the firm f earns in the market d and the 
variable “log(employment)ft” denotes the number of workers that the firm f 
employs. The availability of the former determines the sample size in the last 
two specifications.  
As documented in table 3.4, our variable of interest, retaliation threat, 
is significant in all of the specifications. This suggests that exporting firms 
react to potential AD measures in an export destination by upgrading the 
                                                            
47 See Manova and Zhang (2010) for the same argument. 
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quality of their shipments. In terms of economic magnitudes, when Brazil 
files and AD investigation against the importers of an industry from a 
particular country, Brazilian exporters increase the quality of the exported 
products within the same industry to the named countries by 11% because of 
the threat of retaliation.48 In addition, complementing the earlier studies, the 
coefficient estimates of the size and the revenue variable suggests that firms 
that are larger and that are generating more revenues in a destination export 
higher quality of product varieties to the same destination.  
Who fears more from retaliation?   
The role of export share 
Thus far we have shown that retaliation threats affect the quality of 
the firms’ exported products to the countries subject to AD investigation in 
the home country. In this section, we want to address the argument that 
potential AD claims in an export destination is not equally important for all 
firms. Exporting firms, for which the products of the particular industry in 
the target country constitutes a significant share of their exports, would be 
more responsive to the risk of retaliation. Therefore, in order to have less 
exposure to retaliation, an expected response from these firms is to increase 
the quality of exported products more than those of firms having smaller 
                                                            
48 We use the formula in Kennedy (1981) to convert the coefficient of the dummy variable to 
its true marginal effect.  
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export share for the same product group in the target country. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we first create a variable to measure the export share which 
is calculated as the ratio of firm f’s export sales of products within the 
particular three-digit ISIC industry k in country d to the firm f’s total export 
sales. Second, we include an interaction term between the dummy variable 
which denotes the risk of retaliation and the measure of export share in our 
specifications.   
As shown in the first column of table 5, we obtain a significant 
estimate for the interaction term. The retaliation threat variable also 
remains significant. This suggests that the effect of the retaliation threats on 
the quality of firms’ exports is significantly increasing in the share of the 
exports of the named industries’ products shipped to the target country in the 
firms’ total exports. To gauge the economic significance, consider a one 
standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the firms’ 
products which are exposed to retaliation. Such an increase would be 
associated with a 6% increase in the quality of the exported product to the 
same country. 
Exporters serving the richer countries          
 Do the firms exporting to the developed countries experience more 
exposure to retaliation? The abstract of Hansen and Nielsen (2009) notes: 
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 The GATT/WTO rules allow for antidumping measures if   
domestic producers, exposed to price discrimination, also 
demonstrate injury where price-undercutting is an important 
indicator of the latter. The paper shows that the procedure for 
calculating injury is flawed due to negligence of quality 
differences in the calculation of the margin price-
undercutting. This gives countries with high quality 
producers an option to practice protectionism. This 
asymmetry between countries in ability to implement 
antidumping measures predominantly favors the developed 
countries which are specialized in producing high quality 
products.     
This critical view on AD investigations has important implications in 
terms of our research question. Firms which export to developed countries are 
experiencing tougher competition in their markets where firms produce 
higher quality of products. Since the quality differentials are often ignored in 
the calculation of “fair value”, the risk of being subject to an AD investigation 
is higher in these countries when exporters of the lower quality products 
discriminate prices in order to survive. Following this line of argument, when 
retaliation threat is the focus, exporters which serve the countries richer than 
Brazil will burden more risk of retaliation compared to their counterparts 
which serve the less developed world. Consequently, we expect a higher 
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quality upgrading for the firms serving developed markets resulting from 
retaliation threats.  
To examine this issue, we include an interaction term between our 
policy variable and a binary indicator “Rich” which takes on a value of 1 if the 
destination country is classified as a “developed country” in the World Bank’s 
classification. The coefficient estimates for this specification is reported in the 
second column of Table 5. The interaction term is statistically significant 
along with the actual variable of interest. This clearly points out a higher 
reaction to a threat of retaliation from the exporters which serve the 
developed countries.  In terms of the magnitude of the effect, there is a 15% 
increase in the quality of the products to rich countries because of the threat 
of retaliation within the industry which is subject to filing in Brazil. 
Exporters serving the heavy AD users 
         Although AD policy is spread worldwide, some countries AD activity is 
significantly higher than others. For instance, Japan, which filed the first AD 
investigation in 1982, only has 6 AD petitions until 2000. On the other hand, 
India, one of the latest AD law implementer, has become the heaviest AD 
user in the world. Obviously, the likelihood of being retaliated is higher for 
the firms serving the heavy AD users. Thus, firms might be more responsive 
to the threat of retaliation in these countries given this higher risk.  
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In order to investigate whether the destination countries’ AD activity 
affects the quality choice of the exporting firms’ products which are exposed to 
retaliation, we interact our variable of interest with another dummy variable 
“Heavy” which takes on a value of 1 if the destination country’s total AD 
filings is higher than the average of the total world AD filings in the previous 
five years. The regression estimates obtained using this variable is reported 
in the last column of Table 5. Similar to the earlier estimates, both the 
retaliation threat variable and the interaction term is statistically significant. 
This suggests that the increase in the quality of the exporting firms’ products 
which are susceptible to retaliation is higher in the export destinations which 
are heavy AD users. In terms of economic significance, there is a 13% increase 
in the quality of firms’ exported products to the heavy AD users when these 
countries are defendant in Brazil’s AD investigation within the same 
industry.  
  Conclusion  
Antidumping has become the most frequently implemented non-tariff 
trade barrier over the years. Especially after WTO’s inception in 1995 and 
the dramatic tariff cuts countries have experienced, its importance has been 
increased for the firms which seek alternative instruments of protection. 
Since AD duties are so large as opposed to MFN (Most favored nations) 
tariffs, they have dramatic impact on both dumped imported varieties and 
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domestic production. Although these effects are widely investigated in the 
literature, as noted in Konings and Vandenbussche (2009), there is not much 
work done on their effects on domestic exports. In this study, we examined 
one channel that affects the exporters as a result of the AD investigations 
filed by the domestic industry, which is the risk of retaliation.  
We find strong support for the hypothesis that exporting firms will 
increase the quality of their shipments to the countries named in the AD 
investigations because of the risk of retaliation. Using Brazil’s customs data 
of firm-level exports which has detailed information on products and export 
destinations, we demonstrated a significant quality upgrading after the AD 
filings in the home market from the exporting firms serving the target 
countries with products within the named industry. Potential AD claims, 
resulting from an AD investigation in Brazil, increases the quality of firms’ 
exports for the named industries’ products to the target countries by 11%. 
This effect is significantly increasing in the share of the exports of the named 
industries’ products in the target country in the firms’ total exports. One 
standard deviation increase from the mean in the export share of the firms’ 
products which are exposed to retaliation is associated with a 6% increase in 
the quality of the exported product to the same country. Further, we also 
show that this effect is 4% higher for the exporters serving the developed 
countries and 2% higher for the exporters serving the heavy AD users.  
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Table 3.1. Brazil’s antidumping filings by industries  
(1996-1999) 
 
Three digit ISIC industry  
Number of 
Cases 
   
311 Food products 5 
313 Beverages 0 
314 Tobacco 0 
321 Textiles 3 
322 Wearing Apparel except footwear 0 
323 Leather products 0 
324 Footwear except rubber or plastic 0 
331 Wood products except furniture 0 
332 Furniture except metal 0 
341 Paper and products  0 
342 Printing and publishing 0 
351 Industrial chemicals 27 
352 Other chemicals 3 
353 Petroleum refineries 0 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 0 
355 Rubber products 6 
356 Plastic products 0 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0 
362 Glass and products 1 
369 Other non-metallic min. products 4 
371 Iron and steel 15 
372 Non-ferrous metals 0 
381 Fabricated metal products 2 
382 Machinery except electrical 1 
383 Machinery electric 0 
384 Transport equipment 0 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 2 
390 Other manufactured products 1 
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Table 3.2. Defendant countries in Brazil's antidumping 
investigations  
( 1996-1999) 
 
Country  
Number 
of cases 
   
 USA 10 
 China 9 
 Germany 4 
 South Africa 4 
 France 3 
 India 3 
 Mexico 3 
 Spain 3 
 Romania 3 
 United Kingdom 3 
 Chile 2 
 Japan 2 
 Kazakhstan 2 
 Russia 2 
 Venezuela 2 
 Argentina 1 
 Australia 1 
 Bangladesh 1 
 Bulgaria 1 
 Cuba 1 
 Denmark 1 
 Hong Kong 1 
 Italy  1 
 Netherlands 1 
 New Zealand 1 
 Poland 1 
 Thailand 1 
 Taiwan 1 
 Ukraine 1 
 Uruguay 1 
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Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes firm, 
d denotes destination and t denotes time in years. 
  Sources: SECEX, RAIS and Global Antidumping Database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
      
log	ሺݑ௙௣ௗ௧) 443253 3.588 2.788 -14.957 16.008 
      
log (revenue)fdt 443253 11.989 2.431 4.615 21.112 
      
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ  443253 0.111 0.193 0 1 
      
log(employment)ft 343252 3.985 1.719 0.693 12.105 
      
Export Share 443253 0.270 0.373 1.76E-07 1 
Table 3.3. Summary Statistics 
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Table 3.4. Estimation Results 
(The effect of retaliation threats on the quality of exported products)  
Dependent variable: log ሺݑ௙௣ௗ௧) 
1 2 3 4 
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ  0.113 0.115 0.110 0.118 
 (0.053)** (0.053)** (0.061)** (0.061)** 
log (revenue)fdt  0.043 0.042 0.042 
  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
log (employment) ft   0.010 0.009 
   (0.002)*** (0.002)***
     
Country-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-product-destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.17 0.24 0.28 0.28 
Observations 443253 443253 343252 343252 
Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes 
firm, d  denotes destination and t denotes time in years. Standard errors are in the 
parentheses (clustered by firm-product combinations). ***, **, * show the level of 
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant 
term which is suppressed.    
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Table 3.5. Who fears more from retaliation? 
(The effect of retaliation threats on the quality of exported products)  
Dependent variable: log ሺݑ௙௣ௗ௧) 
The role of 
export share 
The role of richer 
countries 
The role of heavy 
AD users  
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ  0.077 0.081 0.078 
 (0.033)** (0.042)** (0.038)**
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ x Export 
share 0.099   
 (0.054)*   
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ x Rich  0.069  
  (0.017)***  
ሺܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ)௞ௗ,௧ିଵ x Heavy user   0.054 
   (0.019)* 
log (revenue)fdt 0.045 0.120 0.121 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
log (employment) ft 0.010 0.009 0.009 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
    
Country-year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-product-destination fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.28 0.26 0.28 
Observations 343252 343252 343252 
Notes: p denotes six-digit HS product, k denotes three-digit ISIC industry, f denotes 
firm, d denotes destination and t denotes time in years. Standard errors are in the 
parentheses (clustered by firm-product combinations). ***, **, * show the level of 
significance in 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. All specifications include a constant 
term which is suppressed.    
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